Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 204-223 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | DEMOCRATIZATION |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 11 Oct 2019 |
| Publication status | Published - 2020 |
Abstract
Why do authoritarian presidents still use their legislative power? Although recent studies have argued that authoritarian legislatures are more than “rubberstamps” and can serve as arenas for elite bargaining over policy, there is no evidence that legislators would pass bills that go against presidential preferences. This article investigates this apparent paradox and proposes a theoretical framework to explain presidential activism in authoritarian regimes. It argues that any bills that contravene constraints on policy-making set by the president should generally be stopped or amended by other actors loyal to the regime. Thus, presidents will rather use their veto (1) to protect the regime’s output legitimacy and stability, and/or (2) to reinforce their power vis-à-vis other actors. The argument is tested using two case studies of veto use in Kazakhstan and Russia over the last 10 years. The analysis supports the propositions of the theoretical framework and furthermore highlights the potential use of vetoes as a means of distraction, particularly in relation to international audiences. The article extends research on presidential veto power to authoritarian regimes and its findings contribute to the growing literature on the activities of authoritarian legislatures.
Keywords
- authoritarian regimes, dictators, legislative process, presidents, veto power
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
- Geography, Planning and Development
- Social Sciences(all)
- Political Science and International Relations
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In: DEMOCRATIZATION, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2020, p. 204-223.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Why dictators veto
T2 - legislation, legitimation and control in Kazakhstan and Russia
AU - Köker, Philipp
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Why do authoritarian presidents still use their legislative power? Although recent studies have argued that authoritarian legislatures are more than “rubberstamps” and can serve as arenas for elite bargaining over policy, there is no evidence that legislators would pass bills that go against presidential preferences. This article investigates this apparent paradox and proposes a theoretical framework to explain presidential activism in authoritarian regimes. It argues that any bills that contravene constraints on policy-making set by the president should generally be stopped or amended by other actors loyal to the regime. Thus, presidents will rather use their veto (1) to protect the regime’s output legitimacy and stability, and/or (2) to reinforce their power vis-à-vis other actors. The argument is tested using two case studies of veto use in Kazakhstan and Russia over the last 10 years. The analysis supports the propositions of the theoretical framework and furthermore highlights the potential use of vetoes as a means of distraction, particularly in relation to international audiences. The article extends research on presidential veto power to authoritarian regimes and its findings contribute to the growing literature on the activities of authoritarian legislatures.
AB - Why do authoritarian presidents still use their legislative power? Although recent studies have argued that authoritarian legislatures are more than “rubberstamps” and can serve as arenas for elite bargaining over policy, there is no evidence that legislators would pass bills that go against presidential preferences. This article investigates this apparent paradox and proposes a theoretical framework to explain presidential activism in authoritarian regimes. It argues that any bills that contravene constraints on policy-making set by the president should generally be stopped or amended by other actors loyal to the regime. Thus, presidents will rather use their veto (1) to protect the regime’s output legitimacy and stability, and/or (2) to reinforce their power vis-à-vis other actors. The argument is tested using two case studies of veto use in Kazakhstan and Russia over the last 10 years. The analysis supports the propositions of the theoretical framework and furthermore highlights the potential use of vetoes as a means of distraction, particularly in relation to international audiences. The article extends research on presidential veto power to authoritarian regimes and its findings contribute to the growing literature on the activities of authoritarian legislatures.
KW - authoritarian regimes
KW - dictators
KW - legislative process
KW - presidents
KW - veto power
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85074463906&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - https://doi.org/10.15488/5519
DO - https://doi.org/10.15488/5519
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85074463906
VL - 27
SP - 204
EP - 223
JO - DEMOCRATIZATION
JF - DEMOCRATIZATION
SN - 1351-0347
IS - 2
ER -