Details
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 1361-1371 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Philosophy of science |
Volume | 91 |
Issue number | 5 |
Early online date | 8 Feb 2024 |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2024 |
Abstract
In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: one that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects versus in terms of complexity. I argue that each gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the context sensitivity of the psychological subject matter needs to be front and center of methodological and theoretical efforts.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History and Philosophy of Science
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In: Philosophy of science, Vol. 91, No. 5, 12.2024, p. 1361-1371.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - What is the Replication Crisis a Crisis Of?
AU - Feest, Uljana
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s), 2024.
PY - 2024/12
Y1 - 2024/12
N2 - In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: one that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects versus in terms of complexity. I argue that each gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the context sensitivity of the psychological subject matter needs to be front and center of methodological and theoretical efforts.
AB - In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: one that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects versus in terms of complexity. I argue that each gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the context sensitivity of the psychological subject matter needs to be front and center of methodological and theoretical efforts.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85210274220&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/psa.2024.2
DO - 10.1017/psa.2024.2
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85210274220
VL - 91
SP - 1361
EP - 1371
JO - Philosophy of science
JF - Philosophy of science
SN - 0031-8248
IS - 5
ER -