Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 91-112 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - 2004 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Abstract
The theoretical and empirical literature on the polarized debate on environmental standards in the context of trade liberalization in agriculture has focused largely on a protectionist argument for the so called 'race to the bottom'. This paper examines an additional argument for a race to the bottom that is sometimes made in the popular discussion and which has not been formalized, namely that a race to the bottom may not only be justified by protectionist, but also by environmental reasons. We develop a theoretical foundation for the 'environmental' argument through a model analyzing how governments compete with each other in the setting of environmental standards in the presence of transnational externalities. However, both the existing literature as well as own empirical evidence on selected agricultural products and countries show that the conditions on which the argument relies are not likely to be met in most cases. Furthermore, in those cases where a race to the bottom is indeed likely, our model shows that total welfare could be increased if governments could coordinate in setting environmental standards instead.
Keywords
- Environmental standards, International coordination, Race to the bottom, Transnational externalities
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
- Geography, Planning and Development
- Social Sciences(all)
- Development
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In: Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2004, p. 91-112.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Trade liberalization and environmental standards in the agricultural sector
T2 - Is there a race to the bottom for environmental reasons?
AU - Engel, Stefanie
AU - Grote, Ulrike
PY - 2004
Y1 - 2004
N2 - The theoretical and empirical literature on the polarized debate on environmental standards in the context of trade liberalization in agriculture has focused largely on a protectionist argument for the so called 'race to the bottom'. This paper examines an additional argument for a race to the bottom that is sometimes made in the popular discussion and which has not been formalized, namely that a race to the bottom may not only be justified by protectionist, but also by environmental reasons. We develop a theoretical foundation for the 'environmental' argument through a model analyzing how governments compete with each other in the setting of environmental standards in the presence of transnational externalities. However, both the existing literature as well as own empirical evidence on selected agricultural products and countries show that the conditions on which the argument relies are not likely to be met in most cases. Furthermore, in those cases where a race to the bottom is indeed likely, our model shows that total welfare could be increased if governments could coordinate in setting environmental standards instead.
AB - The theoretical and empirical literature on the polarized debate on environmental standards in the context of trade liberalization in agriculture has focused largely on a protectionist argument for the so called 'race to the bottom'. This paper examines an additional argument for a race to the bottom that is sometimes made in the popular discussion and which has not been formalized, namely that a race to the bottom may not only be justified by protectionist, but also by environmental reasons. We develop a theoretical foundation for the 'environmental' argument through a model analyzing how governments compete with each other in the setting of environmental standards in the presence of transnational externalities. However, both the existing literature as well as own empirical evidence on selected agricultural products and countries show that the conditions on which the argument relies are not likely to be met in most cases. Furthermore, in those cases where a race to the bottom is indeed likely, our model shows that total welfare could be increased if governments could coordinate in setting environmental standards instead.
KW - Environmental standards
KW - International coordination
KW - Race to the bottom
KW - Transnational externalities
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=2642522122&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:2642522122
VL - 43
SP - 91
EP - 112
JO - Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture
JF - Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture
SN - 0049-8599
IS - 2
ER -