Toward Cleansing Backdoored Neural Networks in Federated Learning

Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceedingConference contributionResearchpeer review

Authors

  • Chen Wu
  • Xian Yang
  • Sencun Zhu
  • Prasenjit Mitra

Research Organisations

External Research Organisations

  • Pennsylvania State University
  • North Carolina State University
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings
Subtitle of host publication2022 IEEE 42nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2022
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages820-830
Number of pages11
ISBN (electronic)9781665471770
ISBN (print)978-1-6654-7178-7
Publication statusPublished - 2022
Event42nd IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2022 - Bologna, Italy
Duration: 10 Jul 202213 Jul 2022

Publication series

NameProceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Volume2022-July

Abstract

Malicious clients can attack federated learning systems using compromised data during the training phase, including backdoor samples. The compromised global model will perform well on the validation dataset designed for the task, but a small subset of data with backdoor patterns may trigger the model to make a wrong prediction. In this work, we propose a new and effective method to mitigate backdoor attacks in federated learning after the training phase. Through federated pruning method, we remove redundant neurons and "backdoor neurons", which trigger misbehavior upon recognizing backdoor patterns while keeping silent when the input data is clean. The second optional fine-tuning process is designed to recover the pruning damage to the test accuracy on benign datasets. In the last step, we eliminate backdoor attacks by limiting the extreme values of inputs and neural network neurons' weights. Experiments using our defenses mechanism against the state-of-the-art Distributed Backdoor Attacks on CIFAR-10 show promising results; the averaged attack success rate drops more than 70% with less than 2% loss of test accuracy on the validation dataset. Our defense method has also outperformed the state-of-the-art pruning defense against backdoor attacks in the federated learning scenario.

Keywords

    backdoor attack, federated learning, federated model pruning, machine-learning security

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Cite this

Toward Cleansing Backdoored Neural Networks in Federated Learning. / Wu, Chen; Yang, Xian; Zhu, Sencun et al.
Proceedings : 2022 IEEE 42nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2022. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2022. p. 820-830 (Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems; Vol. 2022-July).

Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceedingConference contributionResearchpeer review

Wu, C, Yang, X, Zhu, S & Mitra, P 2022, Toward Cleansing Backdoored Neural Networks in Federated Learning. in Proceedings : 2022 IEEE 42nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2022. Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, vol. 2022-July, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 820-830, 42nd IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2022, Bologna, Italy, 10 Jul 2022. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS54860.2022.00084
Wu, C., Yang, X., Zhu, S., & Mitra, P. (2022). Toward Cleansing Backdoored Neural Networks in Federated Learning. In Proceedings : 2022 IEEE 42nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2022 (pp. 820-830). (Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems; Vol. 2022-July). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS54860.2022.00084
Wu C, Yang X, Zhu S, Mitra P. Toward Cleansing Backdoored Neural Networks in Federated Learning. In Proceedings : 2022 IEEE 42nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2022. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2022. p. 820-830. (Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems). doi: 10.1109/ICDCS54860.2022.00084
Wu, Chen ; Yang, Xian ; Zhu, Sencun et al. / Toward Cleansing Backdoored Neural Networks in Federated Learning. Proceedings : 2022 IEEE 42nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2022. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2022. pp. 820-830 (Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems).
Download
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