Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 1 |
| Journal | Science and engineering ethics |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2023 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Abstract
Even if the “value-free ideal of science” (VFI) were an unattainable goal, one could ask: can it be a useful fiction, one that is beneficial for the research community and society? This question is particularly crucial for scholars and institutions concerned with research integrity (RI), as one cannot offer normative guidance to researchers without making some assumptions about what ideal scientific research looks like. Despite the insofar little interaction between scholars studying RI and those working on values in science, the overlap of topics and interests make collaboration between the two fields promising for understanding research and its ethics. Here, we identify—for the use of RI scholars—the non-epistemic reasons (societal, political, professional) for and against the VFI considered in the literature. All of these are concerned with the beneficial or detrimental consequences that endorsing the VFI would have on society, policy-making, or the scientific community, with some authors appealing to the same principles to argue for opposite positions. Though most of the reviewed articles do not endorse the VFI, it is generally agreed that some constraints have to be put on the use of non-epistemic values. Disagreement on the utility of the VFI lies both on the different epistemic-descriptive positions taken by different authors, and on the scarcity of relevant empirical studies. Engaging critically with the reasons here identified and more in general with the values in science debate will help the RI community decide whether the VFI should be included in future codes of conduct.
Keywords
- Applied ethics, Cognitive values, Empirical philosophy, Ethics of research, Public trust, Social epistemology
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
- Health(social science)
- Nursing(all)
- Issues, ethics and legal aspects
- Medicine(all)
- Health Policy
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Management of Technology and Innovation
Sustainable Development Goals
Cite this
- Standard
- Harvard
- Apa
- Vancouver
- BibTeX
- RIS
In: Science and engineering ethics, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1, 02.2023.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The Value-Free Ideal of Science
T2 - A Useful Fiction? A Review of Non-epistemic Reasons for the Research Integrity Community
AU - Ambrosj, Jacopo
AU - Dierickx, Kris
AU - Desmond, Hugh
N1 - Funding Information: This research is part of a project funded by the FWO, Research Foundation – Flanders (Grant Number: G0D6920N). Publisher Copyright: © 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.
PY - 2023/2
Y1 - 2023/2
N2 - Even if the “value-free ideal of science” (VFI) were an unattainable goal, one could ask: can it be a useful fiction, one that is beneficial for the research community and society? This question is particularly crucial for scholars and institutions concerned with research integrity (RI), as one cannot offer normative guidance to researchers without making some assumptions about what ideal scientific research looks like. Despite the insofar little interaction between scholars studying RI and those working on values in science, the overlap of topics and interests make collaboration between the two fields promising for understanding research and its ethics. Here, we identify—for the use of RI scholars—the non-epistemic reasons (societal, political, professional) for and against the VFI considered in the literature. All of these are concerned with the beneficial or detrimental consequences that endorsing the VFI would have on society, policy-making, or the scientific community, with some authors appealing to the same principles to argue for opposite positions. Though most of the reviewed articles do not endorse the VFI, it is generally agreed that some constraints have to be put on the use of non-epistemic values. Disagreement on the utility of the VFI lies both on the different epistemic-descriptive positions taken by different authors, and on the scarcity of relevant empirical studies. Engaging critically with the reasons here identified and more in general with the values in science debate will help the RI community decide whether the VFI should be included in future codes of conduct.
AB - Even if the “value-free ideal of science” (VFI) were an unattainable goal, one could ask: can it be a useful fiction, one that is beneficial for the research community and society? This question is particularly crucial for scholars and institutions concerned with research integrity (RI), as one cannot offer normative guidance to researchers without making some assumptions about what ideal scientific research looks like. Despite the insofar little interaction between scholars studying RI and those working on values in science, the overlap of topics and interests make collaboration between the two fields promising for understanding research and its ethics. Here, we identify—for the use of RI scholars—the non-epistemic reasons (societal, political, professional) for and against the VFI considered in the literature. All of these are concerned with the beneficial or detrimental consequences that endorsing the VFI would have on society, policy-making, or the scientific community, with some authors appealing to the same principles to argue for opposite positions. Though most of the reviewed articles do not endorse the VFI, it is generally agreed that some constraints have to be put on the use of non-epistemic values. Disagreement on the utility of the VFI lies both on the different epistemic-descriptive positions taken by different authors, and on the scarcity of relevant empirical studies. Engaging critically with the reasons here identified and more in general with the values in science debate will help the RI community decide whether the VFI should be included in future codes of conduct.
KW - Applied ethics
KW - Cognitive values
KW - Empirical philosophy
KW - Ethics of research
KW - Public trust
KW - Social epistemology
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85145957301&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11948-022-00427-9
DO - 10.1007/s11948-022-00427-9
M3 - Article
C2 - 36622481
AN - SCOPUS:85145957301
VL - 29
JO - Science and engineering ethics
JF - Science and engineering ethics
SN - 1353-3452
IS - 1
M1 - 1
ER -