The US trade dispute: blunt offense or rational strategy?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Authors

  • Michael Hübler
  • Axel Herdecke
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)690-696
Number of pages7
JournalApplied economics letters
Volume27
Issue number9
Early online date29 Jul 2019
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Abstract

This article evaluates the recent protectionist US trade policy and the retaliation of the EU and China. The article employs a New Quantitative Trade Theory model and an Armington model for comparison. The simulation results show that US car tariffs are a credible threat to the EU, but the steel and aluminum tariffs are not. China suffers considerably from the US tariffs, especially the latest extended, tightened tariffs. The retaliation measures of the EU and China, however, do not cause significant US welfare losses compared to the situation without mutual trade policy.

Keywords

    China, EU, international organizations, numerical models, Trade policy, trade war, USA

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Cite this

The US trade dispute: blunt offense or rational strategy? / Hübler, Michael; Herdecke, Axel.
In: Applied economics letters, Vol. 27, No. 9, 2020, p. 690-696.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Hübler M, Herdecke A. The US trade dispute: blunt offense or rational strategy? Applied economics letters. 2020;27(9):690-696. Epub 2019 Jul 29. doi: 10.1080/13504851.2019.1644428
Hübler, Michael ; Herdecke, Axel. / The US trade dispute : blunt offense or rational strategy?. In: Applied economics letters. 2020 ; Vol. 27, No. 9. pp. 690-696.
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