The Unity of Robustness: Why Agreement Across Model Reports is Just as Valuable as Agreement Among Experiments

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  • Corey Dethier

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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2733-2752
Number of pages20
JournalErkenntnis
Volume89
Issue number7
Early online date20 Dec 2022
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2024

Abstract

A number of philosophers of science have argued that there are important differences between robustness in modeling and experimental contexts, and—in particular—many of them have claimed that the former is non-confirmatory. In this paper, I argue for the opposite conclusion: robust hypotheses are confirmed under conditions that do not depend on the differences between and models and experiments—that is, the degree to which the robust hypothesis is confirmed depends on precisely the same factors in both situations. The positive argument turns on the fact that confirmation theory doesn’t recognize a difference between different sources of evidence. Most of the paper is devoted to rebutting various objections designed to show that it should. I end by explaining why philosophers of science have (often) gone wrong on this point.

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The Unity of Robustness: Why Agreement Across Model Reports is Just as Valuable as Agreement Among Experiments. / Dethier, Corey.
In: Erkenntnis, Vol. 89, No. 7, 10.2024, p. 2733-2752.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Dethier C. The Unity of Robustness: Why Agreement Across Model Reports is Just as Valuable as Agreement Among Experiments. Erkenntnis. 2024 Oct;89(7):2733-2752. Epub 2022 Dec 20. doi: 10.1007/s10670-022-00649-0, 10.15488/14673
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