The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Authors

  • Michael R. Baye
  • Heidrun C. Hoppe

External Research Organisations

  • Kelley School of Business (KSB)
  • University of Bonn
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)217-226
Number of pages10
JournalGames and economic behavior
Volume44
Issue number2
Early online date17 May 2003
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2003
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

We establish the strategic equivalence of a variety of rent-seeking contests, innovation tournaments, and patent-race games. The results allow us to disentangle negative and positive externalities, and to apply theorems and results intended for rent-seeking games to other games, and vice versa. We conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results.

Keywords

    Contest, Innovation tournament, Patents, R&D, Rent seeking

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Cite this

The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games. / Baye, Michael R.; Hoppe, Heidrun C.
In: Games and economic behavior, Vol. 44, No. 2, 08.2003, p. 217-226.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Baye MR, Hoppe HC. The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games. Games and economic behavior. 2003 Aug;44(2):217-226. Epub 2003 May 17. doi: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00027-7
Baye, Michael R. ; Hoppe, Heidrun C. / The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games. In: Games and economic behavior. 2003 ; Vol. 44, No. 2. pp. 217-226.
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