The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review

Authors

  • Marina Bannikova
  • Artyom Jelnov
  • Pavel Jelnov

Research Organisations

External Research Organisations

  • Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB)
  • Ariel University Center of Samaria
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Article number76
JournalGames
Volume12
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2021

Abstract

This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.

Keywords

    Legislature, Lobbyist, Parties, Voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Cite this

The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures. / Bannikova, Marina; Jelnov, Artyom; Jelnov, Pavel.
In: Games, Vol. 12, No. 4, 76, 12.2021.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review

Bannikova, M, Jelnov, A & Jelnov, P 2021, 'The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures', Games, vol. 12, no. 4, 76. https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040076
Bannikova, M., Jelnov, A., & Jelnov, P. (2021). The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures. Games, 12(4), Article 76. https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040076
Bannikova M, Jelnov A, Jelnov P. The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures. Games. 2021 Dec;12(4):76. doi: 10.3390/g12040076
Bannikova, Marina ; Jelnov, Artyom ; Jelnov, Pavel. / The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures. In: Games. 2021 ; Vol. 12, No. 4.
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