Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 157-173 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Journal of Comparative Economics |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 30 Mar 2017 |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2018 |
Abstract
We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find that the anticipation of receiving new loan programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.
Keywords
- Autocracy, Democracy, IMF, Political transitions, World bank
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
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In: Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 46, No. 1, 03.2018, p. 157-173.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The golden hello and political transitions
AU - Aidt, Toke S.
AU - Albornoz, Facundo
AU - Gassebner, Martin
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2017 Association for Comparative Economic Studies
PY - 2018/3
Y1 - 2018/3
N2 - We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find that the anticipation of receiving new loan programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.
AB - We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find that the anticipation of receiving new loan programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.
KW - Autocracy
KW - Democracy
KW - IMF
KW - Political transitions
KW - World bank
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85017131418&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.17863/CAM.4963
DO - 10.17863/CAM.4963
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85017131418
VL - 46
SP - 157
EP - 173
JO - Journal of Comparative Economics
JF - Journal of Comparative Economics
SN - 0147-5967
IS - 1
ER -