The electoral connection: How the pivotal judge affects oppositional success at European constitutional courts

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  • Christoph Hönnige

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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)963-984
Number of pages22
JournalWest European politics
Volume32
Issue number5
Early online date12 Aug 2009
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2009

Abstract

Constitutional courts are often considered to be ‘veto players’ or ‘third chambers of parliament’. However, no attention has been paid to the composition of European constitutional courts and how they make decisions. Do European judges exhibit political preferences as their US counterparts do? If so, it is important to know who selects the judges as the selection determines the outcome. This article analyses the composition of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the French Conseil constitutionnel. It tests the correlation between the party affiliation of the pivotal judge and oppositional success empirically for all abstract reviews filed between 1974 and 2002. In both countries the likelihood of an oppositional victory or defeat varies with the ideological position of the pivotal judge. This leads to the conclusion that European judges decide on the basis of their political preferences like their US counterparts.

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The electoral connection: How the pivotal judge affects oppositional success at European constitutional courts. / Hönnige, Christoph.
In: West European politics, Vol. 32, No. 5, 09.2009, p. 963-984.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review

Hönnige C. The electoral connection: How the pivotal judge affects oppositional success at European constitutional courts. West European politics. 2009 Sept;32(5):963-984. Epub 2009 Aug 12. doi: 10.1080/01402380903064937
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