Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 127-156 |
| Number of pages | 30 |
| Journal | Legislative studies quarterly |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 26 Jan 2021 |
| Publication status | Published - 25 Feb 2022 |
Abstract
Does a government in a bicameral system strategically alter the length of the legislative process in the first chamber in anticipation of future majorities in the second chamber? Drawing on an existing formal model of dynamic policymaking, we argue that governing majorities strategically accelerate or delay their agenda when a potential majority change in the second chamber is imminent. If the government fears losing control over the second chamber, then the government accelerates their agenda. By contrast, if the government hopes to gain control over the second chamber, the government decelerates their agenda. We test our argument in Germany's symmetric and asymmetric bicameralism by analyzing 1,966 governmental bills from 1998 to 2013. The analyses confirm our expectations for symmetric bicameralism, thus suggesting that the synchronicity of election cycles should be taken into account both in the analysis of bicameral systems and in institutional design of such systems.
Keywords
- bicameralism, Germany, legislative agenda, legislative time, staggered elections
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
- Sociology and Political Science
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In: Legislative studies quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1, 25.02.2022, p. 127-156.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Temporal Strategies
T2 - Governments Alter the Pace of Legislation in Bicameralism Depending on Electoral Expectations
AU - Garwe, Christoph
AU - Engst, Benjamin G.
AU - Stawicki, Yannick G.
AU - Hönnige, Christoph
PY - 2022/2/25
Y1 - 2022/2/25
N2 - Does a government in a bicameral system strategically alter the length of the legislative process in the first chamber in anticipation of future majorities in the second chamber? Drawing on an existing formal model of dynamic policymaking, we argue that governing majorities strategically accelerate or delay their agenda when a potential majority change in the second chamber is imminent. If the government fears losing control over the second chamber, then the government accelerates their agenda. By contrast, if the government hopes to gain control over the second chamber, the government decelerates their agenda. We test our argument in Germany's symmetric and asymmetric bicameralism by analyzing 1,966 governmental bills from 1998 to 2013. The analyses confirm our expectations for symmetric bicameralism, thus suggesting that the synchronicity of election cycles should be taken into account both in the analysis of bicameral systems and in institutional design of such systems.
AB - Does a government in a bicameral system strategically alter the length of the legislative process in the first chamber in anticipation of future majorities in the second chamber? Drawing on an existing formal model of dynamic policymaking, we argue that governing majorities strategically accelerate or delay their agenda when a potential majority change in the second chamber is imminent. If the government fears losing control over the second chamber, then the government accelerates their agenda. By contrast, if the government hopes to gain control over the second chamber, the government decelerates their agenda. We test our argument in Germany's symmetric and asymmetric bicameralism by analyzing 1,966 governmental bills from 1998 to 2013. The analyses confirm our expectations for symmetric bicameralism, thus suggesting that the synchronicity of election cycles should be taken into account both in the analysis of bicameral systems and in institutional design of such systems.
KW - bicameralism
KW - Germany
KW - legislative agenda
KW - legislative time
KW - staggered elections
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85099961945&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/lsq.12327
DO - 10.1111/lsq.12327
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85099961945
VL - 47
SP - 127
EP - 156
JO - Legislative studies quarterly
JF - Legislative studies quarterly
SN - 0362-9805
IS - 1
ER -