Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 586-600 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Social epistemology |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| Publication status | Published - 2022 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Abstract
Distrust in scientific experts can be surprisingly stubborn, persisting despite evidence supporting the experts’ views, demonstrations of their competence, or displays of good will. This stubborn distrust is often viewed as a manifestation of irrationality. By contrast, this article proposes a logic of “status distrust”: low-status individuals are objectively vulnerable to collective decision-making, and can justifiably distrust high-status scientific experts if they are not confident that the experts do not have their best interests at heart. In phenomena of status distrust, social status is thus an indicator of distrust, and this has wider implications for the literatures on trust in science and on expert communication.
Keywords
- distrust in science, Expertise, science denial, social status, trust
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
- Social Sciences(all)
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In: Social epistemology, Vol. 36, No. 5, 2022, p. 586-600.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Status Distrust of Scientific Experts
AU - Desmond, Hugh
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Distrust in scientific experts can be surprisingly stubborn, persisting despite evidence supporting the experts’ views, demonstrations of their competence, or displays of good will. This stubborn distrust is often viewed as a manifestation of irrationality. By contrast, this article proposes a logic of “status distrust”: low-status individuals are objectively vulnerable to collective decision-making, and can justifiably distrust high-status scientific experts if they are not confident that the experts do not have their best interests at heart. In phenomena of status distrust, social status is thus an indicator of distrust, and this has wider implications for the literatures on trust in science and on expert communication.
AB - Distrust in scientific experts can be surprisingly stubborn, persisting despite evidence supporting the experts’ views, demonstrations of their competence, or displays of good will. This stubborn distrust is often viewed as a manifestation of irrationality. By contrast, this article proposes a logic of “status distrust”: low-status individuals are objectively vulnerable to collective decision-making, and can justifiably distrust high-status scientific experts if they are not confident that the experts do not have their best interests at heart. In phenomena of status distrust, social status is thus an indicator of distrust, and this has wider implications for the literatures on trust in science and on expert communication.
KW - distrust in science
KW - Expertise
KW - science denial
KW - social status
KW - trust
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85136520978&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/02691728.2022.2104758
DO - 10.1080/02691728.2022.2104758
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85136520978
VL - 36
SP - 586
EP - 600
JO - Social epistemology
JF - Social epistemology
SN - 0269-1728
IS - 5
ER -