Details
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | Species Problems and Beyond |
Subtitle of host publication | Contemporary Issues in Philosophy and Practice |
Editors | John S. Wilkins, Frank E. Zachos, Igor Ya. Pavlinov |
Pages | 65-90 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Edition | 1. |
ISBN (electronic) | 9780367855604 |
Publication status | Published - 14 Jun 2022 |
Abstract
Species monists claim that all species are members of one, fairly homogeneous kind of entities (the species category) that can be characterised by one metaphysical account of what species are. Species pluralists disagree and hold that the term ‘species’ covers a diversity of entities, such that there is no unified metaphysical account of the nature of species – there are different accounts for the different kinds of entities, but no account that covers them all. While at present, species pluralism is the dominant position, it leaves one important question unanswered: if the term ‘species’ refers to a variety of kinds of entities, what makes them all into species, and why do we treat them as somehow comparable kinds of entities? This chapter answers that question by exploring a middle way between species monism and species pluralism. This involves distinguishing between the theoretical meaning of ‘species’ and the practical usages of the term. I argue that while ‘species’ is a homonymic term in biological practice, it still is possible to identify a theoretical idea that unifies the different usages to a certain extent. This idea, I suggest, is that the term ‘species’ does not denote a kind of entities but rather, a status that can be attributed to a group of organisms on theoretical grounds. Following the view of species developed by Dobzhansky in the 1930s–1940s, I suggest that the theoretical basis for such a status attribution is the question of whether a group represents a stage in the evolutionary process.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- General Arts and Humanities
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- General Business,Management and Accounting
- Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
- General Agricultural and Biological Sciences
- Earth and Planetary Sciences(all)
- General Earth and Planetary Sciences
- Environmental Science(all)
- General Environmental Science
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Species Problems and Beyond: Contemporary Issues in Philosophy and Practice. ed. / John S. Wilkins; Frank E. Zachos; Igor Ya. Pavlinov. 1. ed. 2022. p. 65-90.
Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceeding › Contribution to book/anthology › Research › peer review
}
TY - CHAP
T1 - ‘Species’ as a Technical Term
T2 - Multiple Meanings in Practice, One Idea in Theory
AU - Reydon, Thomas A.C.
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
PY - 2022/6/14
Y1 - 2022/6/14
N2 - Species monists claim that all species are members of one, fairly homogeneous kind of entities (the species category) that can be characterised by one metaphysical account of what species are. Species pluralists disagree and hold that the term ‘species’ covers a diversity of entities, such that there is no unified metaphysical account of the nature of species – there are different accounts for the different kinds of entities, but no account that covers them all. While at present, species pluralism is the dominant position, it leaves one important question unanswered: if the term ‘species’ refers to a variety of kinds of entities, what makes them all into species, and why do we treat them as somehow comparable kinds of entities? This chapter answers that question by exploring a middle way between species monism and species pluralism. This involves distinguishing between the theoretical meaning of ‘species’ and the practical usages of the term. I argue that while ‘species’ is a homonymic term in biological practice, it still is possible to identify a theoretical idea that unifies the different usages to a certain extent. This idea, I suggest, is that the term ‘species’ does not denote a kind of entities but rather, a status that can be attributed to a group of organisms on theoretical grounds. Following the view of species developed by Dobzhansky in the 1930s–1940s, I suggest that the theoretical basis for such a status attribution is the question of whether a group represents a stage in the evolutionary process.
AB - Species monists claim that all species are members of one, fairly homogeneous kind of entities (the species category) that can be characterised by one metaphysical account of what species are. Species pluralists disagree and hold that the term ‘species’ covers a diversity of entities, such that there is no unified metaphysical account of the nature of species – there are different accounts for the different kinds of entities, but no account that covers them all. While at present, species pluralism is the dominant position, it leaves one important question unanswered: if the term ‘species’ refers to a variety of kinds of entities, what makes them all into species, and why do we treat them as somehow comparable kinds of entities? This chapter answers that question by exploring a middle way between species monism and species pluralism. This involves distinguishing between the theoretical meaning of ‘species’ and the practical usages of the term. I argue that while ‘species’ is a homonymic term in biological practice, it still is possible to identify a theoretical idea that unifies the different usages to a certain extent. This idea, I suggest, is that the term ‘species’ does not denote a kind of entities but rather, a status that can be attributed to a group of organisms on theoretical grounds. Following the view of species developed by Dobzhansky in the 1930s–1940s, I suggest that the theoretical basis for such a status attribution is the question of whether a group represents a stage in the evolutionary process.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85148784589&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1201/9780367855604-4
DO - 10.1201/9780367855604-4
M3 - Contribution to book/anthology
AN - SCOPUS:85148784589
SN - 9780367425371
SP - 65
EP - 90
BT - Species Problems and Beyond
A2 - Wilkins, John S.
A2 - Zachos, Frank E.
A2 - Pavlinov, Igor Ya.
ER -