Details
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 233-238 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
Volume | 93 |
Publication status | Published - Sept 2013 |
Abstract
The design allows us to study and derive clean measures of different forms of counterproductive behaviour in a controlled but non-obtrusive manner. We ask participants to complete a specific task (identify euro coins) and to report their output. Participants can engage in various forms of counterproductive behaviour, none of them being offered to them explicitly. They can make mistakes in the identification task, lie in their report or even steal coins. We present an application of the design to study the effects of different pay schemes (competition, fixed pay and piece rate) on counterproductive behaviour. On average counterproductive behaviour amounts to 10 percent of the average productivity, almost all arising through mistakes and overreporting of output. We find essentially no evidence of theft. Moreover, we find that both productive and counterproductive behaviour are significantly higher under competition than under the two other pay schemes.
Keywords
- Compensation, Competition, Counterproductive behaviour, Experiment, Fixed pay, Piece rate
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
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In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 93, 09.2013, p. 233-238.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Sloppy work, lies and theft
T2 - A novel experimental design to study counterproductive behaviour
AU - Belot, Michèle
AU - Schröder, Marina
PY - 2013/9
Y1 - 2013/9
N2 - The design allows us to study and derive clean measures of different forms of counterproductive behaviour in a controlled but non-obtrusive manner. We ask participants to complete a specific task (identify euro coins) and to report their output. Participants can engage in various forms of counterproductive behaviour, none of them being offered to them explicitly. They can make mistakes in the identification task, lie in their report or even steal coins. We present an application of the design to study the effects of different pay schemes (competition, fixed pay and piece rate) on counterproductive behaviour. On average counterproductive behaviour amounts to 10 percent of the average productivity, almost all arising through mistakes and overreporting of output. We find essentially no evidence of theft. Moreover, we find that both productive and counterproductive behaviour are significantly higher under competition than under the two other pay schemes.
AB - The design allows us to study and derive clean measures of different forms of counterproductive behaviour in a controlled but non-obtrusive manner. We ask participants to complete a specific task (identify euro coins) and to report their output. Participants can engage in various forms of counterproductive behaviour, none of them being offered to them explicitly. They can make mistakes in the identification task, lie in their report or even steal coins. We present an application of the design to study the effects of different pay schemes (competition, fixed pay and piece rate) on counterproductive behaviour. On average counterproductive behaviour amounts to 10 percent of the average productivity, almost all arising through mistakes and overreporting of output. We find essentially no evidence of theft. Moreover, we find that both productive and counterproductive behaviour are significantly higher under competition than under the two other pay schemes.
KW - Compensation
KW - Competition
KW - Counterproductive behaviour
KW - Experiment
KW - Fixed pay
KW - Piece rate
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84884412840&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.019
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.019
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84884412840
VL - 93
SP - 233
EP - 238
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
SN - 0167-2681
ER -