Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 461-477 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Episteme |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 26 May 2022 |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2024 |
Abstract
Keywords
- laypersons, science communication, scientific experts, Second-order assessments, sharing epistemic burdens, trustworthiness
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History and Philosophy of Science
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In: Episteme, Vol. 21, No. 2, 01.06.2024, p. 461-477.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Second-Order Assessment of Scientific Expert Claims and Sharing Epistemic Burdens in Science Communication
AU - Barimah, George Kwasi
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s), 2022.
PY - 2024/6/1
Y1 - 2024/6/1
N2 - When laypersons are presented with scientific information which seeks to modify their way of life, they are expected to believe, suspend belief, or reject it. Second-order assessment of scientific experts helps laypersons to make an informed decision in such situations. This is an assessment of the trustworthiness of the person making the scientific claim. In this paper I challenge the optimistic view of Anderson (2011), regarding the ease with which laypersons can perform second-order assessment of experts, by pointing out some of the obstacles that may prevent laypersons from arriving at an informed decision through this means. By showing that laypersons cannot easily perform second-order assessment of experts, I make a case for sharing epistemic burdens in science communication by using Lackey's (2006) concept of dualism in the epistemology of testimony and Irzik and Kurtulmus’ (2019) work on public epistemic trust in science, as a guide. I invite experts to bear a greater share of the epistemic burden when communicating with laypersons because of their privileged epistemic condition vis-à-vis laypersons
AB - When laypersons are presented with scientific information which seeks to modify their way of life, they are expected to believe, suspend belief, or reject it. Second-order assessment of scientific experts helps laypersons to make an informed decision in such situations. This is an assessment of the trustworthiness of the person making the scientific claim. In this paper I challenge the optimistic view of Anderson (2011), regarding the ease with which laypersons can perform second-order assessment of experts, by pointing out some of the obstacles that may prevent laypersons from arriving at an informed decision through this means. By showing that laypersons cannot easily perform second-order assessment of experts, I make a case for sharing epistemic burdens in science communication by using Lackey's (2006) concept of dualism in the epistemology of testimony and Irzik and Kurtulmus’ (2019) work on public epistemic trust in science, as a guide. I invite experts to bear a greater share of the epistemic burden when communicating with laypersons because of their privileged epistemic condition vis-à-vis laypersons
KW - laypersons
KW - science communication
KW - scientific experts
KW - Second-order assessments
KW - sharing epistemic burdens
KW - trustworthiness
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85207811447&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/epi.2022.11
DO - 10.1017/epi.2022.11
M3 - Article
VL - 21
SP - 461
EP - 477
JO - Episteme
JF - Episteme
SN - 1742-3600
IS - 2
ER -