Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 30 |
| Journal | Synthese |
| Volume | 200 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 23 Feb 2022 |
Abstract
I argue that the appropriateness of an assertion is sensitive to context—or, really, the “common ground”—in a way that hasn’t previously been emphasized by philosophers. This kind of context-sensitivity explains why some scientific conclusions seem to be appropriately asserted even though they are not known, believed, or justified on the available evidence. I then consider other recent attempts to account for this phenomenon and argue that if they are to be successful, they need to recognize the kind of context-sensitivity that I argue for.
Keywords
- Assertion, Common ground, Context, Norm of assertion, Science communication, Social epistemology of science
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
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In: Synthese, Vol. 200, No. 1, 30, 23.02.2022.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Science, Assertion, and the Common Ground
AU - Dethier, Corey Nathaniel
N1 - Funding Information: Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. Funding for this paper was provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) - Project 254954344/GRK2073. I would like to thank Haixin Dang, Liam Kofi Bright, and two anonymous reviewers for constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper. The paper also benefited from an audience at Liebniz Universit?t Hannover as well as conversations with Will Fleisher, Samia Hensi, and Mack Sullivan.
PY - 2022/2/23
Y1 - 2022/2/23
N2 - I argue that the appropriateness of an assertion is sensitive to context—or, really, the “common ground”—in a way that hasn’t previously been emphasized by philosophers. This kind of context-sensitivity explains why some scientific conclusions seem to be appropriately asserted even though they are not known, believed, or justified on the available evidence. I then consider other recent attempts to account for this phenomenon and argue that if they are to be successful, they need to recognize the kind of context-sensitivity that I argue for.
AB - I argue that the appropriateness of an assertion is sensitive to context—or, really, the “common ground”—in a way that hasn’t previously been emphasized by philosophers. This kind of context-sensitivity explains why some scientific conclusions seem to be appropriately asserted even though they are not known, believed, or justified on the available evidence. I then consider other recent attempts to account for this phenomenon and argue that if they are to be successful, they need to recognize the kind of context-sensitivity that I argue for.
KW - Assertion
KW - Common ground
KW - Context
KW - Norm of assertion
KW - Science communication
KW - Social epistemology of science
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85125454778&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11229-022-03580-7
DO - 10.1007/s11229-022-03580-7
M3 - Article
VL - 200
JO - Synthese
JF - Synthese
SN - 0039-7857
IS - 1
M1 - 30
ER -