Sanktionen im aktivierenden Arbeitsmarktregime und soziale Exklusion: Eine quantitative Analyse

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Authors

  • Michael Grüttner
  • Andreas Moczall
  • Joachim Wolff

External Research Organisations

  • German Centre for Higher Education Research and Science Studies (DZHW)
  • Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the Federal Employment Agency
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Details

Translated title of the contributionBenefit sanctions in the "activation" paradigm of the German labor market regime and social exclusion: A quantitative analysis
Original languageGerman
Pages (from-to)67-90
Number of pages24
JournalSoziale Welt - Zeitschrift für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und Praxis
Volume67
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2016
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

The German Social Code II (SGBII) defines obligations like job search requirements for recipients of the welfare benefit. Punitive benefit sanctions can be imposed against welfare recipients who do not comply with these rules. This should provide an incentive for welfare recipients to take actions to reduce their welfare dependence and to cooperate with their job center. While their benefits are reduced by a sanction welfare recipients' incomes are lower than the socio-cultural subsistence minimum provided that they cannot compensate the income loss that results from the sanction. Benefit sanctions should help to speed up the integration of welfare recipients into the labor market as a means of social inclusion. Nevertheless, they might also be a possible trigger towards social exclusion. We present first quantitative evidence on the effects of a benefit sanction concerning the perception of social exclusion among sanctioned individuals by drawing theoretically from a model of precarity and resources. We analyze a data set that combines survey data from the "Panel Labour Market and Social Security" (PASS) with administrative data from the German Federal Employment Agency. While descriptive statistics and OLS regressions show a positive association between being sanctioned and the perception of social exclusion, the association disappears in longitudinal analyses using fixed effects. These findings suggest that imposing sanctions does not trigger social exclusion, instead, persons already feeling excluded are at higher risk of being sanctioned. Moreover, the regular threat of sanctions might induce an ex-ante effect on the perception of social exclusion.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sustainable Development Goals

Cite this

Sanktionen im aktivierenden Arbeitsmarktregime und soziale Exklusion: Eine quantitative Analyse. / Grüttner, Michael; Moczall, Andreas; Wolff, Joachim.
In: Soziale Welt - Zeitschrift für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, Vol. 67, No. 1, 01.2016, p. 67-90.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Grüttner, M, Moczall, A & Wolff, J 2016, 'Sanktionen im aktivierenden Arbeitsmarktregime und soziale Exklusion: Eine quantitative Analyse', Soziale Welt - Zeitschrift für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 67-90. https://doi.org/10.5771/0038-6073-2016-1-67
Grüttner, M., Moczall, A., & Wolff, J. (2016). Sanktionen im aktivierenden Arbeitsmarktregime und soziale Exklusion: Eine quantitative Analyse. Soziale Welt - Zeitschrift für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, 67(1), 67-90. https://doi.org/10.5771/0038-6073-2016-1-67
Grüttner M, Moczall A, Wolff J. Sanktionen im aktivierenden Arbeitsmarktregime und soziale Exklusion: Eine quantitative Analyse. Soziale Welt - Zeitschrift für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und Praxis. 2016 Jan;67(1):67-90. doi: 10.5771/0038-6073-2016-1-67
Grüttner, Michael ; Moczall, Andreas ; Wolff, Joachim. / Sanktionen im aktivierenden Arbeitsmarktregime und soziale Exklusion : Eine quantitative Analyse. In: Soziale Welt - Zeitschrift für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und Praxis. 2016 ; Vol. 67, No. 1. pp. 67-90.
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