Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 602-620 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | German politics |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 11 Mar 2019 |
| Publication status | Published - 2019 |
Abstract
Parties across parliamentary republics compete fiercely over capturing the presidential office. However, they are often torn between seeing their preferred candidate elected and exploiting the election for publicity purposes. The German case, specifically parties’ ability to nominate extra-parliamentarian electors (EPEs) as part of the electoral college, offers a particularly interesting perspective on how parties balance these competing goals. While EPEs allow parties to boost their profile and strengthen ties with selected groups, they also present a risk factor as their voting behaviour is more difficult to predict. Based on a novel data set on party delegations in German presidential elections, 1949–2017, the analysis shows that–contrary to traditional assumptions–competition in the electoral college did not play a role in EPE nominations. Rather, party strategies were influenced by the varying signalling power of the elections. Parties were more risk-averse and nominated fewer EPEs during grand coalitions, when they were part of the federal government, or when federal elections approached, yet nominated more EPEs when they had a larger support base to reward. The results call for further comparative research on indirect elections and different types of EPEs in Germany.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
- Sociology and Political Science
- Social Sciences(all)
- Political Science and International Relations
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In: German politics, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2019, p. 602-620.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Risk vs Reward Strategies in Indirect Presidential Elections:
T2 - Political Parties and the Selection of Presidential Electors in Germany, 1949–2017
AU - Köker, Philipp
N1 - Funding Information: I gratefully acknowledge Janne Tukiainen?s substantive comments on an earlier version of this paper presented at the annual conference of the European Political Science Association in 2016. I would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers as well as Benjamin Engst, Cece Janega-McLennan, Philipp Meyer, and Dominic Nyhuis for further insightful comments and suggestions.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - Parties across parliamentary republics compete fiercely over capturing the presidential office. However, they are often torn between seeing their preferred candidate elected and exploiting the election for publicity purposes. The German case, specifically parties’ ability to nominate extra-parliamentarian electors (EPEs) as part of the electoral college, offers a particularly interesting perspective on how parties balance these competing goals. While EPEs allow parties to boost their profile and strengthen ties with selected groups, they also present a risk factor as their voting behaviour is more difficult to predict. Based on a novel data set on party delegations in German presidential elections, 1949–2017, the analysis shows that–contrary to traditional assumptions–competition in the electoral college did not play a role in EPE nominations. Rather, party strategies were influenced by the varying signalling power of the elections. Parties were more risk-averse and nominated fewer EPEs during grand coalitions, when they were part of the federal government, or when federal elections approached, yet nominated more EPEs when they had a larger support base to reward. The results call for further comparative research on indirect elections and different types of EPEs in Germany.
AB - Parties across parliamentary republics compete fiercely over capturing the presidential office. However, they are often torn between seeing their preferred candidate elected and exploiting the election for publicity purposes. The German case, specifically parties’ ability to nominate extra-parliamentarian electors (EPEs) as part of the electoral college, offers a particularly interesting perspective on how parties balance these competing goals. While EPEs allow parties to boost their profile and strengthen ties with selected groups, they also present a risk factor as their voting behaviour is more difficult to predict. Based on a novel data set on party delegations in German presidential elections, 1949–2017, the analysis shows that–contrary to traditional assumptions–competition in the electoral college did not play a role in EPE nominations. Rather, party strategies were influenced by the varying signalling power of the elections. Parties were more risk-averse and nominated fewer EPEs during grand coalitions, when they were part of the federal government, or when federal elections approached, yet nominated more EPEs when they had a larger support base to reward. The results call for further comparative research on indirect elections and different types of EPEs in Germany.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064760636&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.15488/4538
DO - 10.15488/4538
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85064760636
VL - 28
SP - 602
EP - 620
JO - German politics
JF - German politics
SN - 0964-4008
IS - 4
ER -