Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Phys. Rev. A |
| Volume | 76 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 |
Abstract
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In: Phys. Rev. A, Vol. 76, No. 3, 2007.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Reexamination of quantum bit commitment: The possible and the impossible
AU - D'Ariano, Giacomo Mauro
AU - Kretschmann, Dennis
AU - Schlingemann, Dirk
AU - Werner, Reinhard F.
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - Bit commitment protocols whose security is based on the laws of quantum mechanics alone are generally held to be impossible. We give a strengthened and explicit proof of this result. We extend its scope to a much larger variety of protocols, which may have an arbitrary number of rounds, in which both classical and quantum information is exchanged, and which may include aborts and resets. Moreover, we do not consider the receiver to be bound to a fixed honest strategy, so that anonymous state protocols, which were recently suggested as a possible way to beat the known no-go results, are also covered. We show that any concealing protocol allows the sender to find a cheating strategy, which is universal in the sense that it works against any strategy of the receiver. Moreover, if the concealing property holds only approximately, the cheat goes undetected with a high probability, which we explicitly estimate. The proof uses an explicit formalization of general two-party protocols, which is applicable to more general situations, and an estimate about the continuity of the Stinespring dilation of a general quantum channel. The result also provides a natural characterization of protocols that fall outside the standard setting of unlimited available technology and thus may allow secure bit commitment. We present such a protocol whose security, perhaps surprisingly, relies on decoherence in the receiver's laboratory.
AB - Bit commitment protocols whose security is based on the laws of quantum mechanics alone are generally held to be impossible. We give a strengthened and explicit proof of this result. We extend its scope to a much larger variety of protocols, which may have an arbitrary number of rounds, in which both classical and quantum information is exchanged, and which may include aborts and resets. Moreover, we do not consider the receiver to be bound to a fixed honest strategy, so that anonymous state protocols, which were recently suggested as a possible way to beat the known no-go results, are also covered. We show that any concealing protocol allows the sender to find a cheating strategy, which is universal in the sense that it works against any strategy of the receiver. Moreover, if the concealing property holds only approximately, the cheat goes undetected with a high probability, which we explicitly estimate. The proof uses an explicit formalization of general two-party protocols, which is applicable to more general situations, and an estimate about the continuity of the Stinespring dilation of a general quantum channel. The result also provides a natural characterization of protocols that fall outside the standard setting of unlimited available technology and thus may allow secure bit commitment. We present such a protocol whose security, perhaps surprisingly, relies on decoherence in the receiver's laboratory.
U2 - 10.1103/PhysRevA.76.032328
DO - 10.1103/PhysRevA.76.032328
M3 - Article
VL - 76
JO - Phys. Rev. A
JF - Phys. Rev. A
SN - 2469-9934
IS - 3
ER -