Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 747-767 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 15 Apr 2021 |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2021 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Abstract
Communication is a well-known tool to promote cooperation and pro-social behavior. In this study, we examine whether minimal communication in form of public consent with a pre-defined cooperation statement is sufficient to strengthen cooperation in groups. Within the controlled environment of a laboratory experiment, we identify ways by which non-enforceable cooperation statements are associated with higher levels of cooperation in a public good setting. At first, the statement triggers selection; socially oriented individuals are more likely to make the cooperation statement. In addition, we can show that a behavioral change takes place once the statement is made. This change can be attributed to commitment arising from the pledge and to increased coordination between the interaction partners. Depending on the institutional context, these drivers can vary in strength. Comparing compulsory and voluntary cooperation statements, we find that both are effective in motivating higher contributions to the public good.
Keywords
- Communication, Cooperation, Pledge, Policy making, Pro-social behavior, Social dilemma
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Business and International Management
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
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In: Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Vol. 16, No. 4, 10.2021, p. 747-767.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Public cooperation statements
AU - Koessler, Ann Kathrin
AU - Page, Lionel
AU - Dulleck, Uwe
N1 - Funding Information: The authors thank Uri Gneezy, Nicholas Jaquemet, Richard Jefferson, Sarah Necker, Pedro Rey-Biel, Benno Torgler, Caroline van Bers and Israel Waichman for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. The authors would also like to express their special thanks to two anonymous reviewers whose constructive feedback has contributed to improving the quality of this manuscript. Ann-Kathrin Koessler thanks the QUT Business School for the funding of the experiments and the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation for the support.
PY - 2021/10
Y1 - 2021/10
N2 - Communication is a well-known tool to promote cooperation and pro-social behavior. In this study, we examine whether minimal communication in form of public consent with a pre-defined cooperation statement is sufficient to strengthen cooperation in groups. Within the controlled environment of a laboratory experiment, we identify ways by which non-enforceable cooperation statements are associated with higher levels of cooperation in a public good setting. At first, the statement triggers selection; socially oriented individuals are more likely to make the cooperation statement. In addition, we can show that a behavioral change takes place once the statement is made. This change can be attributed to commitment arising from the pledge and to increased coordination between the interaction partners. Depending on the institutional context, these drivers can vary in strength. Comparing compulsory and voluntary cooperation statements, we find that both are effective in motivating higher contributions to the public good.
AB - Communication is a well-known tool to promote cooperation and pro-social behavior. In this study, we examine whether minimal communication in form of public consent with a pre-defined cooperation statement is sufficient to strengthen cooperation in groups. Within the controlled environment of a laboratory experiment, we identify ways by which non-enforceable cooperation statements are associated with higher levels of cooperation in a public good setting. At first, the statement triggers selection; socially oriented individuals are more likely to make the cooperation statement. In addition, we can show that a behavioral change takes place once the statement is made. This change can be attributed to commitment arising from the pledge and to increased coordination between the interaction partners. Depending on the institutional context, these drivers can vary in strength. Comparing compulsory and voluntary cooperation statements, we find that both are effective in motivating higher contributions to the public good.
KW - Communication
KW - Cooperation
KW - Pledge
KW - Policy making
KW - Pro-social behavior
KW - Social dilemma
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85104699378&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11403-021-00327-4
DO - 10.1007/s11403-021-00327-4
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85104699378
VL - 16
SP - 747
EP - 767
JO - Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
JF - Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
SN - 1860-711X
IS - 4
ER -