Profit tax competition and formula apportionment

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Authors

  • Rüdiger Pethig
  • Andreas Wagener

Research Organisations

External Research Organisations

  • University of Siegen
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)631-655
Number of pages25
JournalInternational Tax and Public Finance
Volume14
Issue number6
Early online date21 Feb 2007
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2007

Abstract

We analyze corporate income tax competition with international capital mobility when the common tax base is allocated to governments according to an apportionment formula. Labor can be either internationally mobile or immobile. We compare the Nash equilibria for different apportionment methods. Tax competition produces lower tax rates the more elastically the formula share responds to tax rate changes. More specifically, equilibrium tax rates are typically lowest when apportionment is based on property-shares, followed by payroll- and sales-shares apportionment. Compared to their cooperative levels, equilibrium tax rates are too low for property-share apportionment but tend to be too high for the other formulas.

Keywords

    Formula apportionment, Tax competition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Cite this

Profit tax competition and formula apportionment. / Pethig, Rüdiger; Wagener, Andreas.
In: International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 14, No. 6, 12.2007, p. 631-655.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Pethig R, Wagener A. Profit tax competition and formula apportionment. International Tax and Public Finance. 2007 Dec;14(6):631-655. Epub 2007 Feb 21. doi: 10.1007/s10797-006-9017-5
Pethig, Rüdiger ; Wagener, Andreas. / Profit tax competition and formula apportionment. In: International Tax and Public Finance. 2007 ; Vol. 14, No. 6. pp. 631-655.
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