Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 171-190 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | European Journal for Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 19 Mar 2015 |
| Publication status | Published - 1 May 2015 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Abstract
Many climate scientists have made claims that may suggest that evidence used in tuning or calibrating a climate model cannot be used to evaluate the model. By contrast, the philosophers Katie Steele and Charlotte Werndl have argued that, at least within the context of Bayesian confirmation theory, tuning is simply an instance of hypothesis testing. In this paper I argue for a weak predictivism and in support of a nuanced reading of climate scientists’ concerns about tuning: there are cases, model-tuning among them, in which predictive successes are more highly confirmatory of a model than accommodation of evidence.
Keywords
- Bayesian confirmation theory, Climate models, Problem of old evidence, Tuning
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History and Philosophy of Science
Sustainable Development Goals
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In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Vol. 5, No. 2, 01.05.2015, p. 171-190.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Predictivism and old evidence
T2 - a critical look at climate model tuning
AU - Frisch, Mathias
PY - 2015/5/1
Y1 - 2015/5/1
N2 - Many climate scientists have made claims that may suggest that evidence used in tuning or calibrating a climate model cannot be used to evaluate the model. By contrast, the philosophers Katie Steele and Charlotte Werndl have argued that, at least within the context of Bayesian confirmation theory, tuning is simply an instance of hypothesis testing. In this paper I argue for a weak predictivism and in support of a nuanced reading of climate scientists’ concerns about tuning: there are cases, model-tuning among them, in which predictive successes are more highly confirmatory of a model than accommodation of evidence.
AB - Many climate scientists have made claims that may suggest that evidence used in tuning or calibrating a climate model cannot be used to evaluate the model. By contrast, the philosophers Katie Steele and Charlotte Werndl have argued that, at least within the context of Bayesian confirmation theory, tuning is simply an instance of hypothesis testing. In this paper I argue for a weak predictivism and in support of a nuanced reading of climate scientists’ concerns about tuning: there are cases, model-tuning among them, in which predictive successes are more highly confirmatory of a model than accommodation of evidence.
KW - Bayesian confirmation theory
KW - Climate models
KW - Problem of old evidence
KW - Tuning
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84929088934&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s13194-015-0110-4
DO - 10.1007/s13194-015-0110-4
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84929088934
VL - 5
SP - 171
EP - 190
JO - European Journal for Philosophy of Science
JF - European Journal for Philosophy of Science
SN - 1879-4912
IS - 2
ER -