Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3-27 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Philosophy of the social sciences |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 23 Jun 2016 |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2017 |
Abstract
In this article, I will discuss two prominent views on the relevance and irrelevance of ontological investigations for the social sciences, namely, ontological foundationalism and anti-ontological pragmatism. I will argue that both views are unsatisfactory. The subsequent part of the article will introduce an alternative role for ontological projects in the philosophy of the social sciences that fares better in this respect by paying attention to the ontological assumptions of actual social scientific theories, models, and related explanatory practices. I will illustrate and support this alternative through discussion of three concrete cases.
Keywords
- explanation, ontological foundationalism, philosophy of science in practice, pragmatism, social ontology
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
- Social Sciences(all)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
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In: Philosophy of the social sciences, Vol. 47, No. 1, 01.01.2017, p. 3-27.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Pragmatism, Ontology, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Practice
AU - Lohse, Simon
PY - 2017/1/1
Y1 - 2017/1/1
N2 - In this article, I will discuss two prominent views on the relevance and irrelevance of ontological investigations for the social sciences, namely, ontological foundationalism and anti-ontological pragmatism. I will argue that both views are unsatisfactory. The subsequent part of the article will introduce an alternative role for ontological projects in the philosophy of the social sciences that fares better in this respect by paying attention to the ontological assumptions of actual social scientific theories, models, and related explanatory practices. I will illustrate and support this alternative through discussion of three concrete cases.
AB - In this article, I will discuss two prominent views on the relevance and irrelevance of ontological investigations for the social sciences, namely, ontological foundationalism and anti-ontological pragmatism. I will argue that both views are unsatisfactory. The subsequent part of the article will introduce an alternative role for ontological projects in the philosophy of the social sciences that fares better in this respect by paying attention to the ontological assumptions of actual social scientific theories, models, and related explanatory practices. I will illustrate and support this alternative through discussion of three concrete cases.
KW - explanation
KW - ontological foundationalism
KW - philosophy of science in practice
KW - pragmatism
KW - social ontology
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85001977421&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/0048393116654869
DO - 10.1177/0048393116654869
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85001977421
VL - 47
SP - 3
EP - 27
JO - Philosophy of the social sciences
JF - Philosophy of the social sciences
SN - 0048-3931
IS - 1
ER -