Politicized trade: What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Authors

  • Martin Gassebner
  • Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan

Research Organisations

External Research Organisations

  • Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH
  • ETH Zurich
  • Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC)
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)10-13
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume167
Early online date8 Dec 2017
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2018

Abstract

While it is well understood that industrialized countries use aid to grant political favors, little research covers alternative channels such as trade policy towards developing countries. We analyze eligibility investigations and revoking of U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits to see whether political friends of the U.S. receive favorable treatment. While countries politically aligned with the U.S. are equally likely to be investigated, they are significantly less likely to have their benefits suspended.

Keywords

    Development, Generalized system of preferences, Trade policy, United nations general assembly

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Cite this

Politicized trade: What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences? / Gassebner, Martin; Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 167, 06.2018, p. 10-13.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Gassebner M, Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan A. Politicized trade: What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences? Economics Letters. 2018 Jun;167:10-13. Epub 2017 Dec 8. doi: 10.3929/ethz-b-000213817, 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.005
Gassebner, Martin ; Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik. / Politicized trade : What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences?. In: Economics Letters. 2018 ; Vol. 167. pp. 10-13.
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