Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 101848 |
| Journal | Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics |
| Volume | 98 |
| Early online date | 17 Feb 2022 |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2022 |
Abstract
Pledges are used to signal the intention to act in a socially desirable way. In this study, we examine what role social influence plays in the decision to pledge. In a laboratory experiment, subjects can make a pledge to contribute to a public good in the socially optimal way. Across treatment conditions, we vary the way in which the pledges are elicited. Hence, the degree of social influence on pledge-making is manipulated and its impact can be examined. We find that when individuals are aware that the majority of other subjects decided to pledge, they are likely to conform and also make the pledge. The emergence of such a critical mass can be stimulated by (institutional) design, namely by determining the elicitation order on the basis of previous behavior. Overall, this commitment nudge is effective. Both socially-oriented and previously not socially-oriented subjects modify their behavior after the pledge.
Keywords
- Commitment, Conformity, Pledge, Promise, Public good, Social dilemma, Social influence
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Psychology(all)
- Applied Psychology
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Social Sciences(all)
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In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Vol. 98, 101848, 06.2022.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Pledges and how social influence shapes their effectiveness
AU - Koessler, Ann Kathrin
N1 - Funding Information: Funding for this research was provided by the Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation in the framework of the Alexander von Humboldt-Professorship of Prof. Stefanie Engel.
PY - 2022/6
Y1 - 2022/6
N2 - Pledges are used to signal the intention to act in a socially desirable way. In this study, we examine what role social influence plays in the decision to pledge. In a laboratory experiment, subjects can make a pledge to contribute to a public good in the socially optimal way. Across treatment conditions, we vary the way in which the pledges are elicited. Hence, the degree of social influence on pledge-making is manipulated and its impact can be examined. We find that when individuals are aware that the majority of other subjects decided to pledge, they are likely to conform and also make the pledge. The emergence of such a critical mass can be stimulated by (institutional) design, namely by determining the elicitation order on the basis of previous behavior. Overall, this commitment nudge is effective. Both socially-oriented and previously not socially-oriented subjects modify their behavior after the pledge.
AB - Pledges are used to signal the intention to act in a socially desirable way. In this study, we examine what role social influence plays in the decision to pledge. In a laboratory experiment, subjects can make a pledge to contribute to a public good in the socially optimal way. Across treatment conditions, we vary the way in which the pledges are elicited. Hence, the degree of social influence on pledge-making is manipulated and its impact can be examined. We find that when individuals are aware that the majority of other subjects decided to pledge, they are likely to conform and also make the pledge. The emergence of such a critical mass can be stimulated by (institutional) design, namely by determining the elicitation order on the basis of previous behavior. Overall, this commitment nudge is effective. Both socially-oriented and previously not socially-oriented subjects modify their behavior after the pledge.
KW - Commitment
KW - Conformity
KW - Pledge
KW - Promise
KW - Public good
KW - Social dilemma
KW - Social influence
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85126455971&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101848
DO - 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101848
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85126455971
VL - 98
JO - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
SN - 2214-8043
M1 - 101848
ER -