Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | München |
| Publisher | CESifo GmbH |
| Number of pages | 105 |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2024 |
Publication series
| Name | CESifo Working Papers |
|---|---|
| ISSN (electronic) | 2364-1428 |
Abstract
Cite this
- Standard
- Harvard
- Apa
- Vancouver
- BibTeX
- RIS
München: CESifo GmbH, 2024. (CESifo Working Papers; No. 11594).
Research output: Working paper/Preprint › Working paper/Discussion paper
}
TY - UNPB
T1 - Piece-Rate Incentives and Idea Generation
T2 - An Experimental Analysis
AU - Laske, Katharina
AU - Römer, Nathalie
AU - Schröder, Marina Theresia
PY - 2024/12
Y1 - 2024/12
N2 - We introduce the word illustration task (WIT), a novel experimental task to quantify performance in an idea generation context. Between treatments, we vary whether or not piece-rate (PR) incentives are implemented and the degree to which these incentives are aligned with the desirable outcome. We show that PR incentives have a positive impact on the number of innovative ideas, i.e., the number of ideas that are of high quality and original. We find that unweighted PR incentives (PR provided for any idea) perform at least as well as more aligned weighted PR incentives that are additionally contingent on the quality and/or originality of ideas. Our results suggest that when it comes to fostering idea generation, it is sufficient to incentivize trying instead of incentivizing succeeding.
AB - We introduce the word illustration task (WIT), a novel experimental task to quantify performance in an idea generation context. Between treatments, we vary whether or not piece-rate (PR) incentives are implemented and the degree to which these incentives are aligned with the desirable outcome. We show that PR incentives have a positive impact on the number of innovative ideas, i.e., the number of ideas that are of high quality and original. We find that unweighted PR incentives (PR provided for any idea) perform at least as well as more aligned weighted PR incentives that are additionally contingent on the quality and/or originality of ideas. Our results suggest that when it comes to fostering idea generation, it is sufficient to incentivize trying instead of incentivizing succeeding.
M3 - Working paper/Discussion paper
T3 - CESifo Working Papers
BT - Piece-Rate Incentives and Idea Generation
PB - CESifo GmbH
CY - München
ER -