Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 414-424 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Managerial and Decision Economics |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Publication status | Published - 26 Apr 2019 |
Abstract
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Business and International Management
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Strategy and Management
- Decision Sciences(all)
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Management of Technology and Innovation
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In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 40, No. 4, 26.04.2019, p. 414-424.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Optimal delegation choices in the presence of an incongruent performance measure and double moral hazard
AU - Schöndube-Pirchegger, Barbara
AU - Schöndube, Jens Robert
N1 - Funding information: We acknowledge helpful comments by Jörg Budde, Carolin Mauch, Anna Rohlfing-Bastian, and participants at the ARFA-Workshop in Graz 2016 and at the GEABA symposium 2016.
PY - 2019/4/26
Y1 - 2019/4/26
N2 - An owner-manager can delegate two tasks to an agent. A time constraint prevents him from completing both tasks at first-best levels. He can (a) perform both tasks personally to the extent possible, (b) delegate one task to an agent, or (c) delegate both tasks. Agency costs arise from a congruity problem, a double moral hazard problem, and a risk and incentive trade-off. Delegation becomes more favorable the stronger the time constraint. Once delegation is preferred, the optimal extent of delegation depends on the relation of sensitivity to productivity ratios in both tasks. Agency costs not necessarily increase in delegation level.
AB - An owner-manager can delegate two tasks to an agent. A time constraint prevents him from completing both tasks at first-best levels. He can (a) perform both tasks personally to the extent possible, (b) delegate one task to an agent, or (c) delegate both tasks. Agency costs arise from a congruity problem, a double moral hazard problem, and a risk and incentive trade-off. Delegation becomes more favorable the stronger the time constraint. Once delegation is preferred, the optimal extent of delegation depends on the relation of sensitivity to productivity ratios in both tasks. Agency costs not necessarily increase in delegation level.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85062730262&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1002/mde.3011
DO - 10.1002/mde.3011
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85062730262
VL - 40
SP - 414
EP - 424
JO - Managerial and Decision Economics
JF - Managerial and Decision Economics
SN - 1099-1468
IS - 4
ER -