Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 29-39 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 98 |
| Early online date | 25 Feb 2023 |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2023 |
Abstract
While the pursuitworthiness of philosophical ideas has changed over time, philosophical practice and methodology have not kept pace. The worthiness of a philosophical pursuit includes not only the ideas and objectives one pursues but also the methods with which one pursues them. In this paper, we articulate how empirical approaches benefit philosophy of science, particularly advocating for the use of qualitative methods for understanding the social and normative aspects of scientific inquiry. After situating qualitative methods within empirical philosophy of science, we discuss how to adapt these traditionally sociological methods to empirically inform philosophical questions. Our aim is to normalize and legitimize qualitative methods for philosophical purposes and discuss how they can elucidate descriptive and normative components of scientific practice in a more generalizable non-idealized manner. We contend that qualitative methods are particularly well suited to philosophical interest in the social norms of science, their achievability, and their mutability. Furthermore, unlike more historical case studies in philosophy, qualitative methods enable more confidence in generalizability, albeit limited, from a concrete sample to a larger class. We conclude by addressing anxieties about the distinctness of empirical philosophy of science from social epistemology and from sociology of science.
Keywords
- Boundary-work, Empirical philosophy of science, Philosophical methods, Qualitative methodology, Scientific practice
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History and Philosophy of Science
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In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 98, 04.2023, p. 29-39.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - On the pursuitworthiness of qualitative methods in empirical philosophy of science
AU - Hangel, Nora
AU - ChoGlueck, Christopher
N1 - Funding Information: This article is supported by the German DFG grant #500479165 (9/2022-2025) for the project: The role of scientific judgment in generating knowledge.
PY - 2023/4
Y1 - 2023/4
N2 - While the pursuitworthiness of philosophical ideas has changed over time, philosophical practice and methodology have not kept pace. The worthiness of a philosophical pursuit includes not only the ideas and objectives one pursues but also the methods with which one pursues them. In this paper, we articulate how empirical approaches benefit philosophy of science, particularly advocating for the use of qualitative methods for understanding the social and normative aspects of scientific inquiry. After situating qualitative methods within empirical philosophy of science, we discuss how to adapt these traditionally sociological methods to empirically inform philosophical questions. Our aim is to normalize and legitimize qualitative methods for philosophical purposes and discuss how they can elucidate descriptive and normative components of scientific practice in a more generalizable non-idealized manner. We contend that qualitative methods are particularly well suited to philosophical interest in the social norms of science, their achievability, and their mutability. Furthermore, unlike more historical case studies in philosophy, qualitative methods enable more confidence in generalizability, albeit limited, from a concrete sample to a larger class. We conclude by addressing anxieties about the distinctness of empirical philosophy of science from social epistemology and from sociology of science.
AB - While the pursuitworthiness of philosophical ideas has changed over time, philosophical practice and methodology have not kept pace. The worthiness of a philosophical pursuit includes not only the ideas and objectives one pursues but also the methods with which one pursues them. In this paper, we articulate how empirical approaches benefit philosophy of science, particularly advocating for the use of qualitative methods for understanding the social and normative aspects of scientific inquiry. After situating qualitative methods within empirical philosophy of science, we discuss how to adapt these traditionally sociological methods to empirically inform philosophical questions. Our aim is to normalize and legitimize qualitative methods for philosophical purposes and discuss how they can elucidate descriptive and normative components of scientific practice in a more generalizable non-idealized manner. We contend that qualitative methods are particularly well suited to philosophical interest in the social norms of science, their achievability, and their mutability. Furthermore, unlike more historical case studies in philosophy, qualitative methods enable more confidence in generalizability, albeit limited, from a concrete sample to a larger class. We conclude by addressing anxieties about the distinctness of empirical philosophy of science from social epistemology and from sociology of science.
KW - Boundary-work
KW - Empirical philosophy of science
KW - Philosophical methods
KW - Qualitative methodology
KW - Scientific practice
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85148669868&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.12.009
DO - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.12.009
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85148669868
VL - 98
SP - 29
EP - 39
JO - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
SN - 0039-3681
ER -