Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3389-3411 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | SYNTHESE |
| Volume | 198 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 17 Jun 2019 |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2021 |
Abstract
The philosophy of biology is witnessing an increasing enthusiasm for what can be called “individuals thinking”. Individuals thinking is a perspective on the metaphysics of biological entities according to which conceiving of them as individuals rather than kinds enables us to expose ongoing metaphysical debates as focusing on the wrong question, and to achieve better accounts of the metaphysics of biological entities. In this paper, I examine two cases of individuals thinking, the claim that species are individuals and the claim that life on Earth is an individual. I argue that these claims fail to do the metaphysical work that one would want them to do. I highlight problems with the specific claims as well as with the general notion of ‘individual’, and argue that naturalistic metaphysicians of biology should think of the metaphysical status of theoretical entities, such as species and life, as fundamentally theory-dependent. This implies a metaphysical pluralism, that allows that in some theories species, life, and other such entities may feature as individuals, whereas in others they may feature as kinds.
Keywords
- Biological individuality, Definition of life, Life, Metaphysics of biology, Natural kinds, Species problem
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
- Social Sciences(all)
- General Social Sciences
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In: SYNTHESE, Vol. 198, No. 4, 04.2021, p. 3389-3411.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - On radical solutions in the philosophy of biology
T2 - What does “individuals thinking” actually solve?
AU - Reydon, Thomas A.C.
PY - 2021/4
Y1 - 2021/4
N2 - The philosophy of biology is witnessing an increasing enthusiasm for what can be called “individuals thinking”. Individuals thinking is a perspective on the metaphysics of biological entities according to which conceiving of them as individuals rather than kinds enables us to expose ongoing metaphysical debates as focusing on the wrong question, and to achieve better accounts of the metaphysics of biological entities. In this paper, I examine two cases of individuals thinking, the claim that species are individuals and the claim that life on Earth is an individual. I argue that these claims fail to do the metaphysical work that one would want them to do. I highlight problems with the specific claims as well as with the general notion of ‘individual’, and argue that naturalistic metaphysicians of biology should think of the metaphysical status of theoretical entities, such as species and life, as fundamentally theory-dependent. This implies a metaphysical pluralism, that allows that in some theories species, life, and other such entities may feature as individuals, whereas in others they may feature as kinds.
AB - The philosophy of biology is witnessing an increasing enthusiasm for what can be called “individuals thinking”. Individuals thinking is a perspective on the metaphysics of biological entities according to which conceiving of them as individuals rather than kinds enables us to expose ongoing metaphysical debates as focusing on the wrong question, and to achieve better accounts of the metaphysics of biological entities. In this paper, I examine two cases of individuals thinking, the claim that species are individuals and the claim that life on Earth is an individual. I argue that these claims fail to do the metaphysical work that one would want them to do. I highlight problems with the specific claims as well as with the general notion of ‘individual’, and argue that naturalistic metaphysicians of biology should think of the metaphysical status of theoretical entities, such as species and life, as fundamentally theory-dependent. This implies a metaphysical pluralism, that allows that in some theories species, life, and other such entities may feature as individuals, whereas in others they may feature as kinds.
KW - Biological individuality
KW - Definition of life
KW - Life
KW - Metaphysics of biology
KW - Natural kinds
KW - Species problem
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85067816880&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11229-019-02285-8
DO - 10.1007/s11229-019-02285-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85067816880
VL - 198
SP - 3389
EP - 3411
JO - SYNTHESE
JF - SYNTHESE
SN - 0039-7857
IS - 4
ER -