Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 14 |
| Journal | European Journal for Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 7 Mar 2023 |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2023 |
Abstract
In this paper I shall defend the idea that there is an abstract and general core meaning of objectivity, and what is seen as a variety of concepts or conceptions of objectivity are in fact criteria of, or means to achieve, objectivity. I shall then discuss the ideal of value-free science and its relation to the objectivity of science; its status can be at best a criterion of, or means for, objectivity. Given this analysis, we can then turn to the problem of inductive risk. Do the value judgements regarding inductive risk really pose a threat to the objectivity of science? I claim that this is not the case because they do not lower the thresholds scientifically postulated for objectivity. I shall conclude the paper with a discussion of under-appreciated influences of values on science, which indeed pose a serious threat to the objectivity of some scientific disciplines.
Keywords
- Heather Douglas, Inductive risk, Objectivity, Richard Rudner, Value-free science
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History and Philosophy of Science
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In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Vol. 13, No. 1, 14, 03.2023.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Objectivity, value-free science, and inductive risk
AU - Hoyningen-Huene, Paul
N1 - Funding Information: I wish to thank Catherine Herfeld, Gertude Hirsch, Gero Kellermann, Simon Lohse, Elliot Neaman, Markus Scholz, Stefanie Stadler Elmer, Philippe Tobler, Brad Wray, and three anonymous referees of this journal for very fruitful suggestions concerning earlier versions of this article.
PY - 2023/3
Y1 - 2023/3
N2 - In this paper I shall defend the idea that there is an abstract and general core meaning of objectivity, and what is seen as a variety of concepts or conceptions of objectivity are in fact criteria of, or means to achieve, objectivity. I shall then discuss the ideal of value-free science and its relation to the objectivity of science; its status can be at best a criterion of, or means for, objectivity. Given this analysis, we can then turn to the problem of inductive risk. Do the value judgements regarding inductive risk really pose a threat to the objectivity of science? I claim that this is not the case because they do not lower the thresholds scientifically postulated for objectivity. I shall conclude the paper with a discussion of under-appreciated influences of values on science, which indeed pose a serious threat to the objectivity of some scientific disciplines.
AB - In this paper I shall defend the idea that there is an abstract and general core meaning of objectivity, and what is seen as a variety of concepts or conceptions of objectivity are in fact criteria of, or means to achieve, objectivity. I shall then discuss the ideal of value-free science and its relation to the objectivity of science; its status can be at best a criterion of, or means for, objectivity. Given this analysis, we can then turn to the problem of inductive risk. Do the value judgements regarding inductive risk really pose a threat to the objectivity of science? I claim that this is not the case because they do not lower the thresholds scientifically postulated for objectivity. I shall conclude the paper with a discussion of under-appreciated influences of values on science, which indeed pose a serious threat to the objectivity of some scientific disciplines.
KW - Heather Douglas
KW - Inductive risk
KW - Objectivity
KW - Richard Rudner
KW - Value-free science
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85149935606&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s13194-023-00518-9
DO - 10.1007/s13194-023-00518-9
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85149935606
VL - 13
JO - European Journal for Philosophy of Science
JF - European Journal for Philosophy of Science
SN - 1879-4912
IS - 1
M1 - 14
ER -