Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 910-931 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Journal of European Public Policy |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| Publication status | Published - 2022 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Abstract
Defence integration is frequently in demand but hardly supplied. Sovereignty concerns and a desire for national control constrain integration of the core state power of arms production. The European Aeronautic, Defence and Space (EADS) company (today’s Airbus Group) stands out as an exception to this rule. How was this instance of defence integration supplied? We suggest a two-step network mechanism. First, the structure of national networks shapes the capacity for collective action. Centralised networks are better in forming a joint national position than fragmented networks. Second, networks also operate at the transnational level, shift domestic power balances, and enable agreements. Our process-tracing analysis demonstrates how Germany’s centralised network smoothly adopted a stance on a European firm under private control, whereas domestic negotiations stalled in France. However, a transnational alliance ultimately posed credible threats of exclusion and could overcome this deadlock. Therefore, EADS was both European and predominantly private.
Keywords
- Core state powers, France, Germany, defence integration, integration theory, networks
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
- Sociology and Political Science
- Social Sciences(all)
- Public Administration
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In: Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 29, No. 6, 2022, p. 910-931.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Networked politics and the supply of European defence integration
AU - Weiß, Moritz
AU - Biermann, Felix
N1 - Funding Information: While the newly elected Prime Minister from the Parti Socialiste, Lionel Jospin, had initially opposed any form of privatisation (Le Point, ), once in power, he realised the strong demand for size. Full-scale blocking of any merger was no longer a feasible option. Therefore, Jospin and Defence Minister Alain Richard, supported by his cabinet director François Roussely, ‘hoped to convince’ Serge Dassault to merge his company with Aérospatiale without partially privatising the newly created conglomerate (Sud Ouest, ). Yet, Dassault resisted accepting any state control (Le Monde, ).
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Defence integration is frequently in demand but hardly supplied. Sovereignty concerns and a desire for national control constrain integration of the core state power of arms production. The European Aeronautic, Defence and Space (EADS) company (today’s Airbus Group) stands out as an exception to this rule. How was this instance of defence integration supplied? We suggest a two-step network mechanism. First, the structure of national networks shapes the capacity for collective action. Centralised networks are better in forming a joint national position than fragmented networks. Second, networks also operate at the transnational level, shift domestic power balances, and enable agreements. Our process-tracing analysis demonstrates how Germany’s centralised network smoothly adopted a stance on a European firm under private control, whereas domestic negotiations stalled in France. However, a transnational alliance ultimately posed credible threats of exclusion and could overcome this deadlock. Therefore, EADS was both European and predominantly private.
AB - Defence integration is frequently in demand but hardly supplied. Sovereignty concerns and a desire for national control constrain integration of the core state power of arms production. The European Aeronautic, Defence and Space (EADS) company (today’s Airbus Group) stands out as an exception to this rule. How was this instance of defence integration supplied? We suggest a two-step network mechanism. First, the structure of national networks shapes the capacity for collective action. Centralised networks are better in forming a joint national position than fragmented networks. Second, networks also operate at the transnational level, shift domestic power balances, and enable agreements. Our process-tracing analysis demonstrates how Germany’s centralised network smoothly adopted a stance on a European firm under private control, whereas domestic negotiations stalled in France. However, a transnational alliance ultimately posed credible threats of exclusion and could overcome this deadlock. Therefore, EADS was both European and predominantly private.
KW - Core state powers
KW - France
KW - Germany
KW - defence integration
KW - integration theory
KW - networks
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85105053814&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2021.1916057
DO - 10.1080/13501763.2021.1916057
M3 - Article
VL - 29
SP - 910
EP - 931
JO - Journal of European Public Policy
JF - Journal of European Public Policy
SN - 1350-1763
IS - 6
ER -