Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 103500 |
| Journal | European Economic Review |
| Volume | 130 |
| Early online date | 16 Jun 2020 |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2020 |
Abstract
We study the impact of affirmative action on peer-review behavior. We conduct a real-effort tournament experiment, in which prizes are awarded according to peer-review evaluation. Between treatments, we vary whether or not a quota is implemented and whether or not affirmed individuals face ex-ante procedural disadvantages. We find that quotas lead to distorted peer-reviews, where affirmed individuals receive significantly less favorable reviews than non-affirmed peers with similar performance. Distortions in peer-reviews are robust to changes in ex-ante procedural fairness and seem to be driven by enhanced competition among affirmed individuals.
Keywords
- Affirmative action, Creative work, Peer-review, Procedural fairness, Quota, Real effort
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Finance
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
- Standard
- Harvard
- Apa
- Vancouver
- BibTeX
- RIS
In: European Economic Review, Vol. 130, 103500, 11.2020.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Negative side effects of affirmative action
T2 - How quotas lead to distortions in performance evaluation
AU - Petters, Lea M.
AU - Schröder, Marina
N1 - Funding Information: We thank the editor and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank the Center for Social and Economic Behavior (C-SEB) through the C-SEB Gender Research Grant and the German Research Foundation (DFG) through priority program SPP 1764 [SL 46/2–1] and the research unit “Design and Behavior – Economic Engineering of Firms and Markets” [FOR 1371] for financial support. We thank the audience at the ESA World Meeting 2016 in Jerusalem, ESA European Meeting in Bergen, IMEBESS 2017 in Barcelona, the Research Seminar in Applied Microeconomics in Cologne, the C-SEB Workshop at the University of Cologne, and the Gender Economics Workshop at the DIW Berlin, and Stefano Balietti, Uri Gneezy, Bernd Irlenbusch, Andreas Leibbrandt, Ernesto Reuben, Dirk Sliwka, and Susanne Steffes for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank Tobias Danzeisen and Ruth Neeßen for excellent support in programming and conducting the experiment.
PY - 2020/11
Y1 - 2020/11
N2 - We study the impact of affirmative action on peer-review behavior. We conduct a real-effort tournament experiment, in which prizes are awarded according to peer-review evaluation. Between treatments, we vary whether or not a quota is implemented and whether or not affirmed individuals face ex-ante procedural disadvantages. We find that quotas lead to distorted peer-reviews, where affirmed individuals receive significantly less favorable reviews than non-affirmed peers with similar performance. Distortions in peer-reviews are robust to changes in ex-ante procedural fairness and seem to be driven by enhanced competition among affirmed individuals.
AB - We study the impact of affirmative action on peer-review behavior. We conduct a real-effort tournament experiment, in which prizes are awarded according to peer-review evaluation. Between treatments, we vary whether or not a quota is implemented and whether or not affirmed individuals face ex-ante procedural disadvantages. We find that quotas lead to distorted peer-reviews, where affirmed individuals receive significantly less favorable reviews than non-affirmed peers with similar performance. Distortions in peer-reviews are robust to changes in ex-ante procedural fairness and seem to be driven by enhanced competition among affirmed individuals.
KW - Affirmative action
KW - Creative work
KW - Peer-review
KW - Procedural fairness
KW - Quota
KW - Real effort
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85091779061&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103500
DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103500
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85091779061
VL - 130
JO - European Economic Review
JF - European Economic Review
SN - 0014-2921
M1 - 103500
ER -