License auctions and market structure

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Authors

  • Heidrun C. Hoppe
  • Philippe Jehiel
  • Benny Moldovanu

External Research Organisations

  • University of Bonn
  • University College London (UCL)
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)371-396
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Economics and Management Strategy
Volume15
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2006
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

We analyze the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licenses. Under plausible conditions, we show that auctioning more licenses need not result in a more competitive final outcome, contrary to what common sense suggests. This is due to the nature of competition among incumbents, which sometimes exhibits free-riding. We illustrate some results with examples drawn from the recent European license-auctions for third generation (3G) mobile telephony.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Cite this

License auctions and market structure. / Hoppe, Heidrun C.; Jehiel, Philippe; Moldovanu, Benny.
In: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 15, No. 2, 06.2006, p. 371-396.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Hoppe HC, Jehiel P, Moldovanu B. License auctions and market structure. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 2006 Jun;15(2):371-396. doi: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00104.x
Hoppe, Heidrun C. ; Jehiel, Philippe ; Moldovanu, Benny. / License auctions and market structure. In: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 2006 ; Vol. 15, No. 2. pp. 371-396.
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