Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | qoac023 |
| Journal | Q Open |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 26 Aug 2022 |
| Publication status | Published - 2023 |
Abstract
There is a growing interest in collective contracts to address agri-environmental policy goals at landscape scales. Yet, little is known about farmers' general willingness to cooperate. We developed four treatments of a linear public goods game to investigate farmers' willingness to cooperate: (1) heterogeneous endowments, (2) leading-by-example, (3) social norms, and (4) pinpointing the socially optimal solution. Based on a sample of 358 German farmers, we find that contributions reach more than two-thirds of the initial endowment across different treatments on average. Nudging the socially optimal solution is the most effective treatment. In addition to the experiment, we elicited incentivized predictions on experimental outcomes from 212 experts. Expert beliefs on treatment effects appear to be calibrated on laboratory studies, highlighting the need to conduct, communicate, and discuss experimental studies outside the laboratory. Young female academics with an Economics background most accurately predict farmers' behaviour in the experiment.
Keywords
- Artefactual field experiment, Common Agricultural Policy, Experimental Economics, Methodology
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
- Food Science
- Social Sciences(all)
- Development
- Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
- Agricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
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In: Q Open, Vol. 3, No. 3, qoac023, 2023.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Learning about German farmers' willingness to cooperate from public goods games and expert predictions
AU - Rommel, Jens
AU - Schulze, Christoph
AU - Matzdorf, Bettina
AU - Sagebiel, Julian
AU - Wechner, Vera
N1 - Funding Information: This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement no. 818190. Julian Sagebiel gratefully acknowledges the support of the German Centre for Integrative Biodiversity Research (iDiv) Halle-Jena-Leipzig funded by the German Research Foundation (FZT 118). Acknowledgments
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - There is a growing interest in collective contracts to address agri-environmental policy goals at landscape scales. Yet, little is known about farmers' general willingness to cooperate. We developed four treatments of a linear public goods game to investigate farmers' willingness to cooperate: (1) heterogeneous endowments, (2) leading-by-example, (3) social norms, and (4) pinpointing the socially optimal solution. Based on a sample of 358 German farmers, we find that contributions reach more than two-thirds of the initial endowment across different treatments on average. Nudging the socially optimal solution is the most effective treatment. In addition to the experiment, we elicited incentivized predictions on experimental outcomes from 212 experts. Expert beliefs on treatment effects appear to be calibrated on laboratory studies, highlighting the need to conduct, communicate, and discuss experimental studies outside the laboratory. Young female academics with an Economics background most accurately predict farmers' behaviour in the experiment.
AB - There is a growing interest in collective contracts to address agri-environmental policy goals at landscape scales. Yet, little is known about farmers' general willingness to cooperate. We developed four treatments of a linear public goods game to investigate farmers' willingness to cooperate: (1) heterogeneous endowments, (2) leading-by-example, (3) social norms, and (4) pinpointing the socially optimal solution. Based on a sample of 358 German farmers, we find that contributions reach more than two-thirds of the initial endowment across different treatments on average. Nudging the socially optimal solution is the most effective treatment. In addition to the experiment, we elicited incentivized predictions on experimental outcomes from 212 experts. Expert beliefs on treatment effects appear to be calibrated on laboratory studies, highlighting the need to conduct, communicate, and discuss experimental studies outside the laboratory. Young female academics with an Economics background most accurately predict farmers' behaviour in the experiment.
KW - Artefactual field experiment
KW - Common Agricultural Policy
KW - Experimental Economics
KW - Methodology
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85160598081&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1093/qopen/qoac023
DO - 10.1093/qopen/qoac023
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85160598081
VL - 3
JO - Q Open
JF - Q Open
IS - 3
M1 - qoac023
ER -