Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 767-795 |
| Number of pages | 29 |
| Journal | Journal of public economic theory |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| Early online date | 10 Oct 2013 |
| Publication status | Published - 15 Aug 2014 |
Abstract
In view of the concept of laboratory federalism, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), adopted by the EU as a mode of governance, can be interpreted as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. Its iterative design and focus on good practice are captured by the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare recipients, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibria) and decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibria). The learning dynamics leads to coordination on a strict subset of Nash equilibria, favoring policy choices that can be sustained by a simple majority of Member States.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Finance
- Social Sciences(all)
- Sociology and Political Science
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
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In: Journal of public economic theory, Vol. 16, No. 5, 15.08.2014, p. 767-795.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Laboratory federalism
T2 - The open method of coordination (OMC) as an evolutionary learning process
AU - Ania, Ana B.
AU - Wagener, Andreas
PY - 2014/8/15
Y1 - 2014/8/15
N2 - In view of the concept of laboratory federalism, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), adopted by the EU as a mode of governance, can be interpreted as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. Its iterative design and focus on good practice are captured by the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare recipients, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibria) and decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibria). The learning dynamics leads to coordination on a strict subset of Nash equilibria, favoring policy choices that can be sustained by a simple majority of Member States.
AB - In view of the concept of laboratory federalism, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), adopted by the EU as a mode of governance, can be interpreted as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. Its iterative design and focus on good practice are captured by the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare recipients, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibria) and decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibria). The learning dynamics leads to coordination on a strict subset of Nash equilibria, favoring policy choices that can be sustained by a simple majority of Member States.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84906076853&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/jpet.12079
DO - 10.1111/jpet.12079
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84906076853
VL - 16
SP - 767
EP - 795
JO - Journal of public economic theory
JF - Journal of public economic theory
SN - 1097-3923
IS - 5
ER -