Details
| Translated title of the contribution | Diversity as Paradox: Legal History and the Blind Spots of Law |
|---|---|
| Original language | Spanish |
| Pages (from-to) | 639-657 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Revista de Estudios Histórico-Juridicos |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue number | 43 |
| Publication status | Published - 2021 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Abstract
This contribution argues that, in order to avoid cultural and essentialist fallacies, diversity can only be understood as paradox. Diversity has to be constructed and is therefore subject to temporal, regional, and functional variations, which makes it an extremely fluid category. One manner in which diversity is constructed is through law. While legal history has traditionally been concerned with the manner in which law has historically created differences of personal status, among legal categories, and between sources of law, legal historians of the contemporary world are confronted with the problem of how to observe cultural, ethnic, functional, and other forms of diversity which are not necessarily processed by law. The manner in which nineteenth-century legal systems ignored the particular experience and circumstances of indigenous populations is a case in point: how can the legal historian observe that which law does not? By understanding diversity as paradox, I will argue that a constructivist category of diversity will allow the legal historian to move between legal and non-legal sources without losing from sight the specificity of legal observation.
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In: Revista de Estudios Histórico-Juridicos, Vol. 43, No. 43, 2021, p. 639-657.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - La Diversidad como Paradoja
T2 - Los puntos ciegos del derecho y su reconstrucción histórica
AU - Bastias Saavedra, Manuel
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Ediciones Universitarias de Valparaiso. All rights reserved.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - This contribution argues that, in order to avoid cultural and essentialist fallacies, diversity can only be understood as paradox. Diversity has to be constructed and is therefore subject to temporal, regional, and functional variations, which makes it an extremely fluid category. One manner in which diversity is constructed is through law. While legal history has traditionally been concerned with the manner in which law has historically created differences of personal status, among legal categories, and between sources of law, legal historians of the contemporary world are confronted with the problem of how to observe cultural, ethnic, functional, and other forms of diversity which are not necessarily processed by law. The manner in which nineteenth-century legal systems ignored the particular experience and circumstances of indigenous populations is a case in point: how can the legal historian observe that which law does not? By understanding diversity as paradox, I will argue that a constructivist category of diversity will allow the legal historian to move between legal and non-legal sources without losing from sight the specificity of legal observation.
AB - This contribution argues that, in order to avoid cultural and essentialist fallacies, diversity can only be understood as paradox. Diversity has to be constructed and is therefore subject to temporal, regional, and functional variations, which makes it an extremely fluid category. One manner in which diversity is constructed is through law. While legal history has traditionally been concerned with the manner in which law has historically created differences of personal status, among legal categories, and between sources of law, legal historians of the contemporary world are confronted with the problem of how to observe cultural, ethnic, functional, and other forms of diversity which are not necessarily processed by law. The manner in which nineteenth-century legal systems ignored the particular experience and circumstances of indigenous populations is a case in point: how can the legal historian observe that which law does not? By understanding diversity as paradox, I will argue that a constructivist category of diversity will allow the legal historian to move between legal and non-legal sources without losing from sight the specificity of legal observation.
KW - Diversity
KW - Law
KW - Legal History
KW - Systems Theory
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85115914284&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.4067/S0716-54552021000100639
DO - 10.4067/S0716-54552021000100639
M3 - Article
VL - 43
SP - 639
EP - 657
JO - Revista de Estudios Histórico-Juridicos
JF - Revista de Estudios Histórico-Juridicos
IS - 43
ER -