Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 266-282 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | European Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 19 Mar 2023 |
Abstract
When I say “I know Sarah,” or “I know Berlin,” what sort of knowledge am I claiming? Such knowledge of a particular is, I claim, not reducible to either propositional knowledge-that or to traditional physical know-how. Mere, bare knowledge by acquaintance also does not capture the kind of knowledge being claimed here. Using knowledge of a place as my central example, I argue that this kind of knowledge-of, or “objectual knowledge” as it is sometimes called, is of a distinctive epistemological sort. It is a genre of inherently first-personal aesthetic knowledge, but it also, like know-how, involves active skill. I end by exploring a couple of classic problems in aesthetic epistemology, applied to the case of knowledge-of as active aesthetic knowledge.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
Cite this
- Standard
- Harvard
- Apa
- Vancouver
- BibTeX
- RIS
In: European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 31, No. 1, 19.03.2023, p. 266-282.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Knowing things and going places
AU - Kukla, Quill R.
PY - 2023/3/19
Y1 - 2023/3/19
N2 - When I say “I know Sarah,” or “I know Berlin,” what sort of knowledge am I claiming? Such knowledge of a particular is, I claim, not reducible to either propositional knowledge-that or to traditional physical know-how. Mere, bare knowledge by acquaintance also does not capture the kind of knowledge being claimed here. Using knowledge of a place as my central example, I argue that this kind of knowledge-of, or “objectual knowledge” as it is sometimes called, is of a distinctive epistemological sort. It is a genre of inherently first-personal aesthetic knowledge, but it also, like know-how, involves active skill. I end by exploring a couple of classic problems in aesthetic epistemology, applied to the case of knowledge-of as active aesthetic knowledge.
AB - When I say “I know Sarah,” or “I know Berlin,” what sort of knowledge am I claiming? Such knowledge of a particular is, I claim, not reducible to either propositional knowledge-that or to traditional physical know-how. Mere, bare knowledge by acquaintance also does not capture the kind of knowledge being claimed here. Using knowledge of a place as my central example, I argue that this kind of knowledge-of, or “objectual knowledge” as it is sometimes called, is of a distinctive epistemological sort. It is a genre of inherently first-personal aesthetic knowledge, but it also, like know-how, involves active skill. I end by exploring a couple of classic problems in aesthetic epistemology, applied to the case of knowledge-of as active aesthetic knowledge.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85129393248&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/ejop.12790
DO - 10.1111/ejop.12790
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85129393248
VL - 31
SP - 266
EP - 282
JO - European Journal of Philosophy
JF - European Journal of Philosophy
SN - 0966-8373
IS - 1
ER -