Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 23, Vol. 1 |
| Editors | M.Teresa Espinal, Elena Castroviejo, Manuel Leonetti, Louise McNally, Cristina Real-Puigdollers |
| Pages | 267-283 |
| Publication status | Published - 20 Jul 2019 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Abstract
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Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 23, Vol. 1. ed. / M.Teresa Espinal; Elena Castroviejo; Manuel Leonetti; Louise McNally; Cristina Real-Puigdollers. 2019. p. 267-283.
Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceeding › Contribution to book/anthology › Research › peer review
}
TY - CHAP
T1 - Interpreting polarity-ambiguous propositional anaphors with negative antecedents: Some experimental results
AU - Claus, Berry
AU - Frühauf, Felix
AU - Krifka, Manfred
PY - 2019/7/20
Y1 - 2019/7/20
N2 - The starting point of the present paper is the assumption that negative sentences introduce two propositional discourse referents, one for the negative proposition and one for the negated, positive proposition. Both propositional discourse referents can be picked up by propositional anaphors, resulting in potential ambiguity (e.g. Ernie: Cookie Monster didn’t eat the cookie. Bert: Kermit believes that[CM didn’t eat the cookie / CM ate the cookie]). We report an explorative experimental study on the interpretation of propositional anaphors that are polarity-ambiguous between a resolution with the negative and the positive propositional discourse referent. We employed two different methods, a direct task (forced choice) and a more indirect task (acceptability rating), which yielded mixed results. Taken together, the findings of our study point to a preference for resolving polarity-ambiguous propositional anaphors with the negative propositional discourse referent and they demonstrate the necessity of methodological variety.
AB - The starting point of the present paper is the assumption that negative sentences introduce two propositional discourse referents, one for the negative proposition and one for the negated, positive proposition. Both propositional discourse referents can be picked up by propositional anaphors, resulting in potential ambiguity (e.g. Ernie: Cookie Monster didn’t eat the cookie. Bert: Kermit believes that[CM didn’t eat the cookie / CM ate the cookie]). We report an explorative experimental study on the interpretation of propositional anaphors that are polarity-ambiguous between a resolution with the negative and the positive propositional discourse referent. We employed two different methods, a direct task (forced choice) and a more indirect task (acceptability rating), which yielded mixed results. Taken together, the findings of our study point to a preference for resolving polarity-ambiguous propositional anaphors with the negative propositional discourse referent and they demonstrate the necessity of methodological variety.
U2 - 10.18148/SUB/2019.V23I1.515
DO - 10.18148/SUB/2019.V23I1.515
M3 - Contribution to book/anthology
SP - 267
EP - 283
BT - Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 23, Vol. 1
A2 - Espinal, M.Teresa
A2 - Castroviejo, Elena
A2 - Leonetti, Manuel
A2 - McNally, Louise
A2 - Real-Puigdollers, Cristina
ER -