Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 21 |
| Journal | IZA Journal of Labor Policy |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 8 Oct 2014 |
Abstract
In Germany, imposition of benefit cuts for non-compliant welfare recipients depends on the policy of the local welfare agencies resulting in considerable regional variation, expressed in milder and stricter sanction regimes. Findings from international studies show, that benefit sanctions can substantially increase individual employment uptake. This raises the question, whether a stricter use of sanctions will be effective in Germany. We analyze this question by exploiting the variation of regional sanction regimes as instrumental variables to estimate the LATE of sanctions on the individual employment probability. A tighter sanction policy can be quite effective for non-compliant welfare recipients. JEL codes: I38; J64; C31
Keywords
- Benefit sanctions, IV, LATE, Welfare recipients
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Industrial relations
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Cite this
- Standard
- Harvard
- Apa
- Vancouver
- BibTeX
- RIS
In: IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Vol. 3, No. 1, 21, 08.10.2014.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Intensifying the use of benefit sanctions
T2 - an effective tool to increase employment?
AU - Boockmann, Bernhard
AU - Thomsen, Stephan L.
AU - Walter, Thomas
PY - 2014/10/8
Y1 - 2014/10/8
N2 - In Germany, imposition of benefit cuts for non-compliant welfare recipients depends on the policy of the local welfare agencies resulting in considerable regional variation, expressed in milder and stricter sanction regimes. Findings from international studies show, that benefit sanctions can substantially increase individual employment uptake. This raises the question, whether a stricter use of sanctions will be effective in Germany. We analyze this question by exploiting the variation of regional sanction regimes as instrumental variables to estimate the LATE of sanctions on the individual employment probability. A tighter sanction policy can be quite effective for non-compliant welfare recipients. JEL codes: I38; J64; C31
AB - In Germany, imposition of benefit cuts for non-compliant welfare recipients depends on the policy of the local welfare agencies resulting in considerable regional variation, expressed in milder and stricter sanction regimes. Findings from international studies show, that benefit sanctions can substantially increase individual employment uptake. This raises the question, whether a stricter use of sanctions will be effective in Germany. We analyze this question by exploiting the variation of regional sanction regimes as instrumental variables to estimate the LATE of sanctions on the individual employment probability. A tighter sanction policy can be quite effective for non-compliant welfare recipients. JEL codes: I38; J64; C31
KW - Benefit sanctions
KW - IV
KW - LATE
KW - Welfare recipients
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84983289177&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1186/2193-9004-3-21
DO - 10.1186/2193-9004-3-21
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84983289177
VL - 3
JO - IZA Journal of Labor Policy
JF - IZA Journal of Labor Policy
IS - 1
M1 - 21
ER -