Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2083-2095 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Economic inquiry |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 3 Apr 2013 |
| Publication status | Published - 23 Aug 2013 |
Abstract
Contests between groups are prone to intra-group externalities (free-riding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might be undesirable, both individually and socially. In contests between two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound differences in strength between groups. If the groups are of relatively similar strengths, they are both worse off when they rein in their intra-group externalities compared to a situation where they do not. If groups' strengths differ sufficiently, the relatively strong group benefits at the expense of the relatively weak one. (JEL Z13, D72, N40, D74)
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
- Standard
- Harvard
- Apa
- Vancouver
- BibTeX
- RIS
In: Economic inquiry, Vol. 51, No. 4, 23.08.2013, p. 2083-2095.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Inefficiency as a strategic device in group contests against dominant opponents
AU - Kolmar, Martin
AU - Wagener, Andreas
PY - 2013/8/23
Y1 - 2013/8/23
N2 - Contests between groups are prone to intra-group externalities (free-riding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might be undesirable, both individually and socially. In contests between two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound differences in strength between groups. If the groups are of relatively similar strengths, they are both worse off when they rein in their intra-group externalities compared to a situation where they do not. If groups' strengths differ sufficiently, the relatively strong group benefits at the expense of the relatively weak one. (JEL Z13, D72, N40, D74)
AB - Contests between groups are prone to intra-group externalities (free-riding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might be undesirable, both individually and socially. In contests between two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound differences in strength between groups. If the groups are of relatively similar strengths, they are both worse off when they rein in their intra-group externalities compared to a situation where they do not. If groups' strengths differ sufficiently, the relatively strong group benefits at the expense of the relatively weak one. (JEL Z13, D72, N40, D74)
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84882869120&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/ecin.12012
DO - 10.1111/ecin.12012
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84882869120
VL - 51
SP - 2083
EP - 2095
JO - Economic inquiry
JF - Economic inquiry
SN - 0095-2583
IS - 4
ER -