Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | SEC '23 |
| Subtitle of host publication | Proceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium |
| Editors | Joe Calandrio, Carmela Troncosa |
| Pages | 2509-2525 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| ISBN (electronic) | 978-1-939133-37-3 |
| Publication status | Published - 9 Aug 2023 |
| Event | 32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023 - Anaheim, United States Duration: 9 Aug 2023 → 11 Aug 2023 |
Abstract
Modern software development still struggles with memory safety issues as a significant source of security bugs. The Rust programming language addresses memory safety and provides further security features. However, Rust offers developers the ability to opt out of some of these guarantees using unsafe Rust. Previous work found that the source of many security vulnerabilities is unsafe Rust.
In this paper, we are the first to see behind the curtain and investigate developers' motivations for, experiences with, and risk assessment of using unsafe Rust in depth. Therefore, we conducted 26 semi-structured interviews with experienced Rust developers. We find that developers aim to use unsafe Rust sparingly and with caution. However, we also identify common misconceptions and tooling fatigue that can lead to security issues, find that security policies for using unsafe Rust are widely missing and that participants underestimate the security risks of using unsafe Rust.
We conclude our work by discussing the findings and recommendations for making the future use of unsafe Rust more secure.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Science(all)
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Computer Science(all)
- Information Systems
- Engineering(all)
- Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
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SEC '23: Proceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium. ed. / Joe Calandrio; Carmela Troncosa. 2023. p. 2509-2525 141.
Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Research › peer review
}
TY - GEN
T1 - "I wouldn't want my unsafe code to run my pacemaker"
T2 - 32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023
AU - Holtervennhoff, Sandra
AU - Klostermeyer, Philip
AU - Wohler, Noah
AU - Acar, Yasemin
AU - Fah, Sascha
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © USENIX Security 2023. All rights reserved.
PY - 2023/8/9
Y1 - 2023/8/9
N2 - Modern software development still struggles with memory safety issues as a significant source of security bugs. The Rust programming language addresses memory safety and provides further security features. However, Rust offers developers the ability to opt out of some of these guarantees using unsafe Rust. Previous work found that the source of many security vulnerabilities is unsafe Rust. In this paper, we are the first to see behind the curtain and investigate developers' motivations for, experiences with, and risk assessment of using unsafe Rust in depth. Therefore, we conducted 26 semi-structured interviews with experienced Rust developers. We find that developers aim to use unsafe Rust sparingly and with caution. However, we also identify common misconceptions and tooling fatigue that can lead to security issues, find that security policies for using unsafe Rust are widely missing and that participants underestimate the security risks of using unsafe Rust. We conclude our work by discussing the findings and recommendations for making the future use of unsafe Rust more secure.
AB - Modern software development still struggles with memory safety issues as a significant source of security bugs. The Rust programming language addresses memory safety and provides further security features. However, Rust offers developers the ability to opt out of some of these guarantees using unsafe Rust. Previous work found that the source of many security vulnerabilities is unsafe Rust. In this paper, we are the first to see behind the curtain and investigate developers' motivations for, experiences with, and risk assessment of using unsafe Rust in depth. Therefore, we conducted 26 semi-structured interviews with experienced Rust developers. We find that developers aim to use unsafe Rust sparingly and with caution. However, we also identify common misconceptions and tooling fatigue that can lead to security issues, find that security policies for using unsafe Rust are widely missing and that participants underestimate the security risks of using unsafe Rust. We conclude our work by discussing the findings and recommendations for making the future use of unsafe Rust more secure.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85176137671&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85176137671
SP - 2509
EP - 2525
BT - SEC '23
A2 - Calandrio, Joe
A2 - Troncosa, Carmela
Y2 - 9 August 2023 through 11 August 2023
ER -