Guaranteed manufactured without child labor: The economics of consumer boycotts, social labeling and trade sanctions

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Authors

  • Arnab K. Basu
  • Nancy H. Chau
  • Ulrike Grote

External Research Organisations

  • College of William and Mary
  • Cornell University
  • University of Bonn
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)466-491
Number of pages26
JournalReview of development economics
Volume10
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 25 Jul 2006
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

Does labeling products "Child-Labor Free" provide a market-based solution to the pervasive employment of child labor? This paper explores the promise of social labeling in the context of its four oft-noted objectives: child labor employment, consumer information, welfare, and trade linkages, when competition between the North and South is based both on comparative cost advantage, and the use of child labor as a hidden product attribute. We show that (i) social labeling benefits consumers and Southern producers, whereas children and Northern producers are worse off; (ii) trade sanctions on unlabeled products deteriorates Southern terms of trade, but leaves the incidence of child labor strictly unaffected; and (iii) a threat to sanction imports of unlabeled Southern products discourages the South from maintaining a credible social labeling program. We also explore the question of whether social labeling should be viewed as a transitory or a permanent institution in developing economies.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sustainable Development Goals

Cite this

Guaranteed manufactured without child labor: The economics of consumer boycotts, social labeling and trade sanctions. / Basu, Arnab K.; Chau, Nancy H.; Grote, Ulrike.
In: Review of development economics, Vol. 10, No. 3, 25.07.2006, p. 466-491.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Download
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