Group Identities in Conflicts

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review

Authors

  • Martin Kolmar
  • Andreas Wagener

Research Organisations

External Research Organisations

  • University of St. Gallen (HSG)
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)165-192
Number of pages28
JournalHomo Oeconomicus - Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics
Volume36
Issue number3-4
Publication statusPublished - 14 Sept 2019

Abstract

If the members of a group identify with their group, free-riding behavior within the group is reduced. This seems beneficial at first sight. However, in contests between groups, identification escalates conflicts, increasing rent dissipation and possibly generating welfare losses. Generally, in an inter-group conflict the adoption or non-adoption of a group identity is endogenous. We show that, if groups are similar in size and conflict technology, all groups will adopt a group identity, reducing welfare for all. If groups are unequal, the stronger one will develop a group identity, which goes at the expense of the weaker group. Out-group hostility favors asymmetric identities. Applications include team spirit in war and sports, national identities or (seemingly) dysfunctional behavior of social groups.

Keywords

    Contests, Social identities, Parochial altruism, Prisoners' dilemma, D74, H41

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Cite this

Group Identities in Conflicts. / Kolmar, Martin; Wagener, Andreas.
In: Homo Oeconomicus - Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Vol. 36, No. 3-4, 14.09.2019, p. 165-192.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review

Kolmar, M & Wagener, A 2019, 'Group Identities in Conflicts', Homo Oeconomicus - Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, vol. 36, no. 3-4, pp. 165-192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-019-00083-8
Kolmar, M., & Wagener, A. (2019). Group Identities in Conflicts. Homo Oeconomicus - Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 36(3-4), 165-192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-019-00083-8
Kolmar M, Wagener A. Group Identities in Conflicts. Homo Oeconomicus - Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics. 2019 Sept 14;36(3-4):165-192. doi: 10.1007/s41412-019-00083-8
Kolmar, Martin ; Wagener, Andreas. / Group Identities in Conflicts. In: Homo Oeconomicus - Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics. 2019 ; Vol. 36, No. 3-4. pp. 165-192.
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