Feyerabend and Kuhn

Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceedingContribution to book/anthologyResearchpeer review

Authors

  • Paul Hoyningen-Huene

Research Organisations

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Details

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages219-238
Number of pages20
ISBN (electronic)978-3-031-71938-7
ISBN (print)978-3-031-71937-0
Publication statusPublished - 20 Nov 2024

Publication series

NameBoston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science
Volume346
ISSN (Print)0068-0346
ISSN (electronic)2214-7942

Abstract

I begin the chapter with biographical remarks, especially, when and how Feyerabend and Kuhn met. Then, I discuss the concept of incommensurability. Perhaps surprisingly, Feyerabend and Kuhn did disagree about several aspects of this concept, which has often not been seen appropriately in the literature. I first discuss their agreements, and then the main differences in their understanding of incommensurability. Then I discuss Feyerabend’s general criticism of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Feyerabend’s criticism is rather harsh, explicitly accusing Kuhn of propaganda. Feyerabend is especially enraged about Kuhn’s positive evaluation of Kuhn’s normal science. However, a closer analysis of Feyerabend’s arguments against normal science reveal that they are not very strong and somewhat biased. The chapter ends with some remarks about Feyerabend’s and Kuhn’s reconciliation in the late 1980s.

Keywords

    Ideology, Incommensurability, Normal science, Paul Feyerabend, Scientific progress, Thomas Kuhn

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Cite this

Feyerabend and Kuhn. / Hoyningen-Huene, Paul.
Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Springer Nature, 2024. p. 219-238 (Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science; Vol. 346).

Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceedingContribution to book/anthologyResearchpeer review

Hoyningen-Huene, P 2024, Feyerabend and Kuhn. in Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol. 346, Springer Nature, pp. 219-238. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71938-7_12
Hoyningen-Huene, P. (2024). Feyerabend and Kuhn. In Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science (pp. 219-238). (Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science; Vol. 346). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71938-7_12
Hoyningen-Huene P. Feyerabend and Kuhn. In Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Springer Nature. 2024. p. 219-238. (Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science). doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-71938-7_12
Hoyningen-Huene, Paul. / Feyerabend and Kuhn. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Springer Nature, 2024. pp. 219-238 (Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science).
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