Details
| Translated title of the contribution | Evaluation of social policy reforms |
|---|---|
| Original language | German |
| Article number | 205 |
| Pages (from-to) | 205-213 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Zeitschrift fur Arbeitsmarktforschung |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue number | 1-2 |
| Early online date | 29 Mar 2011 |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2011 |
Abstract
This paper illustrates the evaluation of changes in social policy regulations with respect to two reforms that strengthened the rights of either employers or employees. Causal effects of the reform are based on control group designs (difference-in-differences estimates). The results show that interventions of the state in the labor market also have negative effects—besides the desired supportive/distributional effects for sick people in one case and for parents in the other. The regulation that the employer has to pay an absent sick worker 100 instead of 80 percent of the wage increases the average days of absence from work from about 6 to 8 days (estimates vary by specification, some estimates even exhibit higher effects), without significantly negatively affecting subjective health indicators. The regulation that demands employers to guarantee comparable employment to a parent even after 3 years of absence reduces employer-arranged training for young women.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Industrial relations
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Sustainable Development Goals
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In: Zeitschrift fur Arbeitsmarktforschung, Vol. 44, No. 1-2, 205, 01.06.2011, p. 205-213.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Evaluation sozialpolitischer Reformen
AU - Puhani, Patrick A.
AU - Sonderhof, Katja
N1 - Funding Information: Part of this research was supported by German Research Foundation (DFG) within the project ‘Labour Market Effects of Social Policy’ which is part of the research initiative ‘Flexibility in Heterogeneous Labour Markets’. We are grateful to the editor, Bernd Fitzenberger, several anonymous referees, Christian Dustmann, John Heywood, Jeff Smith, Uta Schönberg, Alfonso Sousa-Poza, Marie Waller, Fan Wu and many conference participants for helpful comments. All remaining errors are our own.
PY - 2011/6/1
Y1 - 2011/6/1
N2 - This paper illustrates the evaluation of changes in social policy regulations with respect to two reforms that strengthened the rights of either employers or employees. Causal effects of the reform are based on control group designs (difference-in-differences estimates). The results show that interventions of the state in the labor market also have negative effects—besides the desired supportive/distributional effects for sick people in one case and for parents in the other. The regulation that the employer has to pay an absent sick worker 100 instead of 80 percent of the wage increases the average days of absence from work from about 6 to 8 days (estimates vary by specification, some estimates even exhibit higher effects), without significantly negatively affecting subjective health indicators. The regulation that demands employers to guarantee comparable employment to a parent even after 3 years of absence reduces employer-arranged training for young women.
AB - This paper illustrates the evaluation of changes in social policy regulations with respect to two reforms that strengthened the rights of either employers or employees. Causal effects of the reform are based on control group designs (difference-in-differences estimates). The results show that interventions of the state in the labor market also have negative effects—besides the desired supportive/distributional effects for sick people in one case and for parents in the other. The regulation that the employer has to pay an absent sick worker 100 instead of 80 percent of the wage increases the average days of absence from work from about 6 to 8 days (estimates vary by specification, some estimates even exhibit higher effects), without significantly negatively affecting subjective health indicators. The regulation that demands employers to guarantee comparable employment to a parent even after 3 years of absence reduces employer-arranged training for young women.
KW - Health
KW - Maternity leave
KW - Sick pay
KW - Training
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84976468000&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s12651-011-0071-9
DO - 10.1007/s12651-011-0071-9
M3 - Artikel
AN - SCOPUS:84976468000
VL - 44
SP - 205
EP - 213
JO - Zeitschrift fur Arbeitsmarktforschung
JF - Zeitschrift fur Arbeitsmarktforschung
SN - 1867-8343
IS - 1-2
M1 - 205
ER -