Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 494-509 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Economics Bulletin (EB) |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
Abstract
Using a three-stage least squares estimator, this paper analyzes within a three equation model the effects of companylevel pacts involving reciprocal concessions in Germany, We find that such agreements between employers and employees commonly fail to achieve their primary objective to stabilize or to extend the employment but the agreements do result in increased investments relative to the real capital stock. A matching estimator confirms this result. We furthermore distinguish between different collective bargaining regimes, We find that in establishments without any kind of collective bargaining the negative employment and the positive investment effects are stronger than in firms with industry-level bargaining. In firms with company-level bargaining we cannot find significant investment effects. The employment effects are similar to those of industry-level bargaining establishments.
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In: Economics Bulletin (EB), Vol. 34, No. 1, 2014, p. 494-509.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Effects of reciprocal concessions on employment and real capital
AU - Bellmann, Lutz
AU - Gerner, Hans Dieter
AU - Hübler, Olaf
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - Using a three-stage least squares estimator, this paper analyzes within a three equation model the effects of companylevel pacts involving reciprocal concessions in Germany, We find that such agreements between employers and employees commonly fail to achieve their primary objective to stabilize or to extend the employment but the agreements do result in increased investments relative to the real capital stock. A matching estimator confirms this result. We furthermore distinguish between different collective bargaining regimes, We find that in establishments without any kind of collective bargaining the negative employment and the positive investment effects are stronger than in firms with industry-level bargaining. In firms with company-level bargaining we cannot find significant investment effects. The employment effects are similar to those of industry-level bargaining establishments.
AB - Using a three-stage least squares estimator, this paper analyzes within a three equation model the effects of companylevel pacts involving reciprocal concessions in Germany, We find that such agreements between employers and employees commonly fail to achieve their primary objective to stabilize or to extend the employment but the agreements do result in increased investments relative to the real capital stock. A matching estimator confirms this result. We furthermore distinguish between different collective bargaining regimes, We find that in establishments without any kind of collective bargaining the negative employment and the positive investment effects are stronger than in firms with industry-level bargaining. In firms with company-level bargaining we cannot find significant investment effects. The employment effects are similar to those of industry-level bargaining establishments.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84899145601&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84899145601
VL - 34
SP - 494
EP - 509
JO - Economics Bulletin (EB)
JF - Economics Bulletin (EB)
IS - 1
ER -