Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 101080 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Information economics and policy |
| Volume | 66 |
| Early online date | 23 Jan 2024 |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2024 |
Abstract
We investigate patent litigation, settlements and R&D incentives on a market where two firms develop technologies in order to obtain patents and produce goods. Firms may sell IP rights to a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) that acts as intermediary for patent monetization. We find that compared to simultaneous market entry, the effect of this so-called patent privateering is mitigated if firms enter sequentially. Furthermore, we show that privateering may decrease industry profits by distortion of R&D incentives even when there is no rent extraction by the PAE.
Keywords
- Innovation, Intellectual property rights, Patent assertion entities, Patent licensing, R&D, Sequential entry
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Environmental Science(all)
- Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
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In: Information economics and policy, Vol. 66, 101080, 03.2024.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Effects of patent privateering on settlements and R&D under sequential market entry
AU - Klapper, Felix B.
AU - Siemering, Christian
N1 - Funding Information: This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
PY - 2024/3
Y1 - 2024/3
N2 - We investigate patent litigation, settlements and R&D incentives on a market where two firms develop technologies in order to obtain patents and produce goods. Firms may sell IP rights to a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) that acts as intermediary for patent monetization. We find that compared to simultaneous market entry, the effect of this so-called patent privateering is mitigated if firms enter sequentially. Furthermore, we show that privateering may decrease industry profits by distortion of R&D incentives even when there is no rent extraction by the PAE.
AB - We investigate patent litigation, settlements and R&D incentives on a market where two firms develop technologies in order to obtain patents and produce goods. Firms may sell IP rights to a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) that acts as intermediary for patent monetization. We find that compared to simultaneous market entry, the effect of this so-called patent privateering is mitigated if firms enter sequentially. Furthermore, we show that privateering may decrease industry profits by distortion of R&D incentives even when there is no rent extraction by the PAE.
KW - Innovation
KW - Intellectual property rights
KW - Patent assertion entities
KW - Patent licensing
KW - R&D
KW - Sequential entry
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85183640737&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2024.101080
DO - 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2024.101080
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85183640737
VL - 66
JO - Information economics and policy
JF - Information economics and policy
SN - 0167-6245
M1 - 101080
ER -