Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 434-458 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Scottish Journal of Political Economy |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 28 Sept 2018 |
| Publication status | Published - 6 Jul 2019 |
Abstract
Reliable institutions, i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep foster cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that ‘the system’ had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that learned that attempts only did not affect their payoffs or that were not exposed to corruption at all.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
- Sociology and Political Science
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
- Standard
- Harvard
- Apa
- Vancouver
- BibTeX
- RIS
In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 66, No. 3, 06.07.2019, p. 434-458.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment
AU - Fochmann, Martin
AU - Jahnke, Björn
AU - Wagener, Andreas
PY - 2019/7/6
Y1 - 2019/7/6
N2 - Reliable institutions, i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep foster cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that ‘the system’ had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that learned that attempts only did not affect their payoffs or that were not exposed to corruption at all.
AB - Reliable institutions, i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep foster cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that ‘the system’ had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that learned that attempts only did not affect their payoffs or that were not exposed to corruption at all.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85054077660&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/sjpe.12197
DO - 10.1111/sjpe.12197
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85054077660
VL - 66
SP - 434
EP - 458
JO - Scottish Journal of Political Economy
JF - Scottish Journal of Political Economy
SN - 0036-9292
IS - 3
ER -