Details
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 333-341 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
Volume | 171 |
Early online date | 18 Feb 2020 |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2020 |
Abstract
Because accountability may improve the comparability that is compromised by lenient grading, we compare exit exam outcomes in the same schools before and after a policy change that increased teacher accountability by anchoring grading scales through centralization. In particular, using a large administrative dataset of 364,445 exit exam outcomes for 72,889 students, we find that centralization increased inequality in scoring between the higher and lower performing schools by about 25%. In addition, the reform improved relative scoring outcomes for schools with larger shares of male students and lowered relative scoring outcomes for schools with a higher share of minority students.
Keywords
- Policy reform, Rating standards, Subjective performance evaluation, Transparency
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
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In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 171, 03.2020, p. 333-341.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Does increased teacher accountability decrease leniency in grading?
AU - Puhani, Patrick A.
AU - Yang, Philip
N1 - Funding Information: Part of this research was funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. This research would not have been possible without the onsite data access provided by the Ministry of Culture and Education of the State of Hesse (Hessisches Kultusministerium) in cooperation with the Research Data Center (Forschungsdatenzentrum) of the Statistical Office of the State of Hesse (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt). We thank two anonymous referees, Manuel Boos, Patrick Kampkötter, Thomas Cornelissen, Marc Deutschmann, Christian Dustmann, Peter Gottfried, Claudia Leiterholt, Alexander Richter, Uta Schönberg, and Klaus F. Zimmermann as well as seminar participants at CReAM, University College London, and at the International Economic Association World Congress for helpful comments.
PY - 2020/3
Y1 - 2020/3
N2 - Because accountability may improve the comparability that is compromised by lenient grading, we compare exit exam outcomes in the same schools before and after a policy change that increased teacher accountability by anchoring grading scales through centralization. In particular, using a large administrative dataset of 364,445 exit exam outcomes for 72,889 students, we find that centralization increased inequality in scoring between the higher and lower performing schools by about 25%. In addition, the reform improved relative scoring outcomes for schools with larger shares of male students and lowered relative scoring outcomes for schools with a higher share of minority students.
AB - Because accountability may improve the comparability that is compromised by lenient grading, we compare exit exam outcomes in the same schools before and after a policy change that increased teacher accountability by anchoring grading scales through centralization. In particular, using a large administrative dataset of 364,445 exit exam outcomes for 72,889 students, we find that centralization increased inequality in scoring between the higher and lower performing schools by about 25%. In addition, the reform improved relative scoring outcomes for schools with larger shares of male students and lowered relative scoring outcomes for schools with a higher share of minority students.
KW - Policy reform
KW - Rating standards
KW - Subjective performance evaluation
KW - Transparency
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85079546431&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.017
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.017
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85079546431
VL - 171
SP - 333
EP - 341
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
SN - 0167-2681
ER -